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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This study was conducted by the National Association of Schools of
Public Affalrs and Administration (NASPAA) at the request of
USAID/Honduras under the terms of NASPAA's Technical Cooperative
Agreement with USAID. The study examined the experiences of
USAID/Honduras and the Government of Honduras with the contracting out
of construction activities in three sectors. The purpose of the study
was to document empirical evidence regarding the performance of
contracting out as a policy measure to increase private sector
initiatives in Honduras.
Specifically, the question of the study was:
To what extent have any changes in the institutional
arrangements--the shift to a system which encourages delivery
by the private sector of publicly financed goods and
services--succeeded in improving th~ quality of outputs, in
reducing the time of delivery, and in decreasing the cost to
the public sector?
The study made comparisons among AID-funded and other p'"ojects in which
there have been changes in the method of service delivery. A shift fr~m
direct administration to contracting out was analyzed for the following
three sectors:
Housing Shelter and Urban Upgrading Programs
Rural Primary School Cons~ruction Programs
Rural Road Construction Progr~~
The study generated several important findings about the nature of
contracting out which would prove useful in initiating policy reform
toward privatizatlon in developing countries. First, there was little
difference in the quality of outputs between direct administration and
contracting out. This observation is contrary to the widespread belief
that contr3cting out leads to higher quality. The comparable quality
can be attributed to the fact that both methods relied on virtually
identical construction techniques and material. In the case of rural
school construction, the direct administration produced comparable
quality due to active community participation.
Second, the time needed to complete projects was about the same for the
two methods. There was some evidence which indicated that the private
contractors were sli~htly f~ster. However, private construction was
delayed by bureaucratic regulations such as long period of awarding
contract.
Third, contracting out did not result in substantial reduction in cost
of construction. Cost reduction by the private sector is usually
brought about by competitive markets, technological or managerial
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innovations, and lower compensation outlays for private sector
employees. However, in the Honduran case, there are questiol~ about the
competitiveness among contractors. It also appears that the private
sector had little incentive to introduce technological or mdnagerial
innovations for cost reduction. Thi~ is because contract awards were
guided by the reference price system set by the government. In
addition, the private sector paid a similar amount of compensation
costs and conformed to the 13th month salary law.
For policy makers in Honduras the study provides important observations
about the design of policy measures intended to privatize publicly
funded services. Most of all, it should be noted that the performance
of contracting out depends heavily on the institutional environment of
the nation. In Honduras the 1985 Contracting Law provided a positive
legal background for potentially stable and reasonable relationships
between the government and the private contractors. However, if the
government wants to improve the performance of contracting out, it must
continue to initiate further institutional changes. Among the import3nt
tasks include the following:
To realign the bureaucratic procedures required for awarding
contract in order to shorten the contract award period.
To alter the reference price system so that private
contractors can have incentives to reduce costs of inputs.
To encourage more use of manual labor and labor intensive
techniques in contracting out.
To restructure public sector employments in order to remove
duplication of efforts when projects are contracted out.
To use performance standards in place of ~pecification codes
for construction projects for the purpose of encouraging
technological or managerial innovations.
To make markets more competitive.
Whether the government should pur~ue privatization effort or not must
be determined in the light of the overall national policy objectives.
This is because the effort to provide public services more efficiently
by privatization creates multiple impacts on political and economic
dimensions. The public sector may be able to reduce the cost of
producing services and decrease the time of construction by contracting
out. But, these results will b~ accompanied by a lower level of
community participation in certain projects and resistance a~ong public
employees who want to keep their jobs. Therefore, if the government"s
key objective is to encourage community participation and to maintain
political stability, a sudden transition to priv~tizatioll is not
necessarily desirable. On the other hand, if the gov~rnment is
intere5ted in creating new jobs in t"e construction industry,
contracttng out is a viacle alternative to pursue.
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In sum, this study reveals that the policy decisions about contracting
out in particular and privatization in general must be made in
consideration of broad policy objectives at the national level. At
present the knowledge bdsis to help policy makers deal with this issue
is severely limited. We propose at least three areas for further work.
First, there is a need to conduct similar studies in other sectors and
other countries. These additional studies will be able to provide
clearer evidence about the factors affecting the effectiverless of
privatization efforts. Second, it seems crucial to investigate how
different national policy objectives are served by privatization of
publ:c service deliv~ry. It would be particularly important to examine
the re~'ities of the political objectives which are often hidden in a
typical economic analysis of public policy. Third, for practical
purpos2, it would be useful to prepare an implementation manual for
privatization which can be readily used by officials of developing
countries. Such a manual will greatly improve the proces~ of actual
policy dialogue and serve as an efficient means to facilitate policy
reform.

CHAPTER 1
FRAMEWORK, OBJECTIVES, "AND METHOD OF ANALVSIS
A. Conceptual Framework
Over the past few years, there has been increasing attention paid to
alternative mechanisms for relieving the fi~cal burdens of th~ public
sector and for promoting efficiency, innovation, and incentives throu~h
activity within the private sector. while much of the emphasis has
focused on government-owned enterprises, there are a variety of
alternatives to this approach. The continuum of private to public
alternatives in ownership, decision-making authority, and the
production and delivery of goods and services is wide indeed. These
alternatives range from complete divestiture to partial divestiture to
variations in the public/private relationship in the delivery of
servic2s. Within the context of alternative service delivery options
one can include the fo!lo~inQ possible mechanisms: contracti~J-out of
service delivery, franchising, subsidizing private sector execution of
a service, voluntarism, self-help, alterations in tax and regulatory
policies or other inducements to private sector action, reducing
~ervice demand, the use of temporary help from private firms, and the
application of user fees and charges to adjust demand (2.H- Hatry,
1983: 3).

This study focuses on one subset of these choices: contracting out for
the constructior. of infrastructure. As USAID Administrator Peter
McPherson noted, contracting out principally is the transfer of
decision-making authority:
••• in which the responsibility to provide certain public services
(and, in some cases, ownership of the assets) is retained by the
host government, but the implementation of certain functions
(typically operation and maintenance of f~cilities and equipment)
is delivered by private entities through such mechanisms as
service contracting, franchise agreements, or lease, or reliance
upon such instruments as a voucher system or regulatory and tax
incentives (1.A- U5AID, June, 1986: 3).
Traditionally, the argument for the decision as to whether the public
or private sector is more appropriate for the provision of services and
production of goods has rested on the assumption of potential "market
failures" as well as the nature of "p~blic guods." Generally, the
assumption is made that where private markets function effectively,
both consumer preferenc~ and production effic~ency are well served.
Potential oroblems in t'"tJ mar'ket would include:
1>
the existence of "natural monopolies;"
2)
incl·eased production is associated wi th "decreased costs;"
3)
where there ~re externalities which are not reflected in thp
~rivate cost;
4)
where it is diffi~uit to charge for a good/service, or to
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5)

exclude those who do not pay;
where some form of merit good, as determined by society,
exists.

However, in recent years the increasing burden of reliance on the
public sector and the increasing recognition that goverqment failure
may be as pervasi ve and onerous as market fai lure, ha'ie led to a
rethinking of the nature of a "public good" and the:>. 'propriateness of
public sector delivery/production of even these good~.. Again, as AID
Administrator McPherson has noted:
The conventional approach to providing many services is for
gover~ment to collect the revenue needed to support the service
and to deliver the service as well. The implicit premise in this
view is that local public services are all "public goods" ••• Yet,
most local public services have few attributes of pure public
goods. Most of them ... have specific identifiable users, who are
the service's principal ueneficiaries ... Even for services that are
closer to being pure public goods, it is not at all clear that
government must be the deliverer of the service (1.A- AID, 1986:
4) •

Among the advantages generally associated with the contracting out of
services, the following have been identified: lowers costs or improves
performance for the same service, provides for specialized skills,
promotp.s the transfer of those skills to the private sector, limits the
expansion of government, avoids initial large-scale costs, permits
greater flexibility in adjusting program size and term, may provide a
yardstick for cost and efficiency comparisons, and may produce (and
transfer to the private sector) better managerial skills. Among
potential disadvantages, the following have been identified: the
reduction of costs issue is not clear; it may result in poorer or
discriminatory service to citizen/consumers; it may increase the
potential for corruption; contractors may default on completion of
contracts; it may displace public employees; it may prove to be
difficult to design needed contract ~tatements; depending on the
context there may be administrative and allocative inefficiencies
because of legal and institutional problems; enforcing public policy
and monitoring contract performance may be affected; it may not provide
adequate competition (2.H-Hatry, 1984:15).

B. Objectives
This st~dy attempts to examine some of these potential advantag~s and
disadvantages within the context of Honduras. Contracting out should
not be thought of as a panacea for accomplishing privatization of
services. It is not necessarily the case that "the more the private
sector does, the better." Policy makers are often caught in the
dilemma of strategic choices among mul~iple goals. Each approach must
be considered within the cont~xt of the goals of th~ program in order
to evaluate when and under what cnnditions which appru~ch is more
appropriate. Competition, employment generation, conLumer access,
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distributional equity, reduction of public sector burdens, expanding
private sector capabilities <technical and managerial) are all
worthwhile goals; however, these and others may not be pursuable within
the cont~xt of a single answer as to whether one approach or the other
is "better." Better for what is a mrire appropriate question. Also, it
is not a casE' of "either/or"; a num'oer of intermediate positions where
both direct administration (public sector provision) and contracting
out <private sector provision) can ~e utilized in tandem.
The main objectives of this study ar~ to assess the problems,
advantages, and disadvantages associatp.d with contracting cut and
direct administration. By assessing the experiences of USAID/Honduras
in the three areas of shelter housing and urban upgrading, primary
school construction, and rural r~ad construction, there may be some
important insights and caveats as to the apprupriateness of approaches
and potential changes in the current administration of these
approaches.
C. Method of Analysis
The central question of this study on the "contracting out" in Honduras
is the following:
To what extent have any changes in the institutional
arrangements--the shift to a system which encourages
delivery by the private sector of publically-financed
goods and services-- succeeded in stimulating private
sector activity, in improving quality and speed of
delivery, and in reducing costs of the public sector?
The study attempted to compare systematically the delivery of goods and
services of different institutional arrangements. In general, there are
a number of key questions relevant to the evaluation of contracting-out
experiences. These include:

o

Macro-Economic factors. How do "contracting" out
arrangements affect the macro-economy of a country?

o

Contextual Environment. How do e~onomic, political, legal
conditions of a nation affect the private sector's capacity
for involvement in contracting out with the public sector?

o

Efficiency of Contracting Out. How efficient is the
contiactual arrangement in terms ~f costs of production,
timing of production, and quality of output?

o

Effects on Public Sector Employment. To what extent have
there been changes in public sector employment levels and
roles as a result of contrecting out?

o

Legal and Institutional Issues. To what extent have the legal
and institutional factors affected contracting out?
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o

Consumer Input and Choice. To what extent does contracting
out affect consumer input into decisior.-making and choice in
Honduras?

o

Qistribution Issues. Are there any distributional or access
implications in ccntracting out?

o

Facility Maintenance. To what degree h~v~ there been changes
in facility maintenance as a result of contracting out?

o

Public Sector Vs Private Sector Relationships. To what extent
have public and private sector relationships changed as a
result of contracting out procedures?

For specific projects, three sets of issues need to be analyzed in
order to assess the advantages, disadvantages, and problems associated
with contracting-out: 1) institutional, 2) technical and engineering,
and 3) economic issues.
The major institutional

issu~s

are:

a
a
a
a
a

Legal issues of contracting out
Bidding procedures for contractors
Government-contractor relationships
Government responsibilities of projects/ contractor
Performance by contractors
a Institutional implications of private contracting
a External market conditiDns and impacts
The major technical/engineering issues are:

o

Design

o

Man~gement

o
o

Environmental impacts
Engineering legal issues

techniqu~s

o Construction techniques
techniques

o Government oversight

The major economic issues are:

o Analysis of efficiency
o Financial analysis
o Distributional impacts

v Employment

o

and labor issues
External and market conditions and impacts

In this study we deal selectively with these key issues. We focus on
institution~l arrangements, costs, timing of construction programs in
housing, primary schools, and roads. AID/Honduras has supported
various programs in each of thase areas with differing levels and types
of contracting out arrangements. Table 1-1 presents the programs
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examined by this study. The programs are classified in terms of
relative degrees of direct administration and contracting-out.
Each sector was studied separately as the designs, planning,
administration, implementation, and 'use of contracturs were
sufficiently different. Overall generalizations and conclusions are
made for the individual sectors within their separate chapters. In
addition, overall conclu~ions and recommendations are made in the final
chapter. The variables studied necessarily shifted in each sector
studied. Thus, although there are overall general variables! they may
be treated differently in each sector.
Information was collected from existing documents available in Honduras
during the period from October to December, 1986. In addition, the
study team interviewed USAID officials, public sector officials, and
private sector persons. Field trips were made to housing construction,
rural school construction, and rural road sites. (See Appendix for
bibliography of documents and people interviewed>
The study represented a 150 ddy work effort by NASPAA. It included a 15
work' day planning effort in Washington prior to arrival in Honduras;
130 field work days in Honduras; and 5 work days editing in Washington.
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TABLE 1-1
CLA9SIF1CATION OF PROGRAMS STUDIED

Sectors

Direct Administration
Urban Upgrading by DINA
and CMDC (AID funded)

Contracting-Out
Urban Upgrading by CMDC
(AID funded)

Housing
Low-i~come Hou~ing

Construction by INVA
(AID funded)

Rural

Rural Classrooms by MOE
(AID funded)

Rurdl Classrooms by MOE
(AID funded)

Pr~mary

Sci", JO Is

Rural

Rural Classrooms by MOE
(GOH funded)

Road Rehabilitation
(Manual labor) by SECOPT

Road Rehabilitation by
SECOPT (AID funded)
Road Construction by
SECOPT (AID funded)

Roads

Road Construction
(Manual labor) by SECOPT
Road Construction by
SECOPT (lOB funded)
Road Construction by
SECOPT (World Bank
funded)

CHAPTER 2
HOUSING AND URBAN UPGRADiNG
A. Background
It is estimated that the population of Honduras as of 1985 was 4.2
million with over 700,000 housing units, of which 21X are found in the
metropolitan areas of Tegucigalpa and San Pedro Sula, 9X in other urban
areas, and 70X in rurai areas. (10.C- Rourk, 1986: 1-4) Over 70X of the
urban population of the country was unable to obtain conventional
housing finance in 1974. (11.K- AID, 1985) A survey conducted by
USAID/Honduras in 1979 concluded that 55X of the families in marginal
b3rrics did not have access to piped water services, 66X did not have
sewer connections, and 25X did not have access to electricity. The
estimated populations of these mar~inal communities totaled 31,000
hou~ehold5 in Tegu~igalpa and 19,000 households in San Pedro Sula.
(11.K- AID, 1985) Several general characteristics of the condition and
tenure status of housing in Hondura5 are descr!bed in Table 11-1.
Honduras does not have a population problem as such with only 4.2
million people or 32 inhabitants per square kilometer. However, the
populatiun growth rate was approximately 3.3X in 1985. The urban
po~t.!lation growth rate is double that, or 6.2X per year.
Consequemtly,
the nation's erban population increased from 29X of the total
population in 1970 to 39% in i985. The rate of increase of the urban
"marginal" (poorl population has been increasing at a rate of four
times that of the nation as a whole and twice that of the urban
cp-nters. That is to ~ay, the urban poor of Honduras are increasing at
the phenomenal rate of 12% per year. Should this rate remain
unchanged, the urban poor can be expected to double in size
approximately every six years. A significant consequence of this
explosion of the urban po~r population has been an increasing number of
lan~ invasions: twenty-seven in Tegucigalpa alone in 1980-1981. (11.KAID, 1985)
Honduras' National Development Plan for 1982-1986 estimated that
approximately 100,000 substandard housing units are found in the urban
areas. (10.[- CONSUPLANE, 1980) About 90X of these units are occupied
by low ]ncome families) these families earning less than the median
family incDme. (11.M- AID, 1985) Prior to the emphasis made by AID's
Housing Guaranty (HG) programs, Honduras private sector housing
construction supplied the high income end of the market and there was
little public sector production of low income housing or few public
works for the low income- "marginal" population. In addition~ there was
little housing financing available to low income families.
B. Housinq

PrograM~

During the 19605 and 1970s Honduran housing policy was geared
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primarily to direct government-built and subsidized housing units.
These activities benefitted middle-income households primarily. Recent
policies for low-income residents have evolved through collaboration
among AID and various Honduran institutions such as INVA and the
National Housing Finance Agency (FINAVI).
Once a program has been developed, AID and the Honduras government
enter into an implementation agreement that defines the use of the loan
funds, The borrower obtains a loan at the prevailing interest rate
from an eligible private U.S. lender of its choice. Upon signing the
loan agreement, AID executes a contract of guarantee for the U.S.
lender indicating that loan repayment is guaranteed against all risks
~y the U.S. government.
At the same time, AID obtains a full-faith and
credit guar~ntee of repayment from the host country. In 1977, the
Government of Honduras, in its National Housing Policy, committed
i tsel f t'::l "focus on low income persons". AID presently has three
shelter programs in operation: Shelter for the Urban Poor (522-HG005); Private Sector Shelter (~22-HG-007), and Urban Upgrading (522-HG006). The first two provide low cost housing and home improvement
loans ta~geted for the urban poor and the last one ,provides public
services, such as potable water and sewage disposal systems for the
same population. The ambitious goal of these thr~e programs was stated
in the Private Sector Shelter and the Urban Upgrading Project papers:
At the pea:, production level, the three AID shelter projects in
Honduras will improve 5,000 existing housing units in marginal
communities and will finance 4,500 new housing units per year.
Thi!; level of production, if sustained, would satisfy the basic
shelter needs of the urban poor residing in Tegucigalpa and San
Pedro Sula within twenty years, that is, by the year 2002. (11.MAID, 1985)
It [urban upgrading] is designed to increase assistance
sub~itantially to the more than 60% of the population in th8 two
major cities who live in settlements with inadequate or no basic
urban services ••. (II.F- AID, 1981)
A fourth project (522-HG-008), Shelter for the Urban Poor, is scheduled
to begin in 1987.
A summary description of the USqID/Honduras housing projects is as
follows: (I1.A- AID~ 1986)
Shelter for the Urb~n Poor I - On November 20, 1980 AID and the
Government of Honduras (GOH) signed an Implementation Agreement for HG
Loan 522-HG-005. The purpose of the project was to develop within
(INVA) a capability t.o produce and deliver approximately 2,000 lowcost shelter units and 1,000 home improvement loans annually to
families below the median income level in certain urban centers of
Honduras. The project was to finance 4,340 new housing units and 3,000
home improvement loans.
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The project was estimated to cost $15.8 million of which the HG loan
was to finance $10.5 million, INVA $5 million, and an AID grant
$300,000. The estimated completion date for the project was September
30, 1983.
Urban Upgrading in Marginal Communities - On June 6, 1980 AID and the
Government of Honduras (GOH) signed an implementation agreement fo. HG
loan 522-HG-006. The purpose of the project was to lmprove the
capacity of the municipal governments of Tegucigalpa and San Pedro Sula
to implement cost-recoverable programs to upgrade marginal urban
communities by providing infrastructure, such as water and sewer
services, and by financing home improvement loans. The project was to
provide basic infrastructure to about 80 marginal communities in
Tegucigalpa and San Pedro Sula with an estimated population of 31,000
families. The home improvement loans were to benefit between 2,000 and
2,500 families.
The implementing agencies for the project were the municipalities of
Tegucigalpa and San Pedro Sula, wi~h $7.5 million allocated to
Tegucigalpa and $2.5 million to San Pedro Sula.
The estimated cost of the proj~ct Has $12,850,000 of Hhich the HG loan
was to finance $10 million, AID grant.s $350,000, the municipalities of
Tegucigalpa $2 million, and San Pedro Sula $500,000. The estimated
completion date for the project was April 30, 1984.
Private Sector Shelter Program - On September 28, 1981 AID and the
Government of Honduras (GOH) signed an Implementation Agreemel't for the
Loan 522-HG-007. The purpose of the project was to establish a
functional ~ystem for expanded private sector involvement in the
provision of shelter affordable by the urban poor in Honduras. The
project was to finance Phase I of the government's Emergency Housing
Plan. It was to consist of the r.onstruction, sale and mortgage
financing by the private sector of approximately 6,721 housing units in
the urban areas of 7egucigalpa and S~n Pedro Sula. Projects included
housing developments in the neighborhoods of La Mo~a II, La Planeta,
Satelite, San Jorge, and Centroamerica Oeste.
FINAVI was the implementing agency for the project. FINAVI was the
regulatory agency for the savings and loan system in Honduras. AID
assisted in the establishment of FINAVI in 1975 with a $4 million seed
capital loan. FINAVI was to provide construction financing to the
developers through its affiliated savings and loan associations. AID
authorized a r~volying 0dvance for up to $7.5 million in HG funds for
construction financing. After the housing units were sold, FI~AVI was
to pur=hase eligible mortgages from the associations and use the
mortgage to support the AID guaranteed disbursements under the HG loan.
The estimated cost of mortgage financing for the project was $27
million, of which the HG loan was to finance $25 million dnd FINAVI $2
million. In addition, AID agreed to provide a grant of $75,000 for
technical assistance. The e5timated completion date for the project
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was March 31, 1983.
C. Institutional Analysis
1. AID Management of Housing Guarantee Projects
All three programs are expected to be completed in 1986. Table 11-2,
Item 3 below shows that the three programs are far behind schedule.
Presently Urban Upgrading (005) has less than $225,000 to disburse,
Private Sector Shelter (007) has $80,000 remaining to be spent, and
Shelter for the Urban Poor (005) has $1,635,000 in the account with
$543~000 approved for disbursement but which is being held in escrow
because the GOH is in arrears in its payments to AID. The Private
Sector Shelter Program (007) had $10 million reprogrammed from its $25
million original budget when FINAVI was abolished by the GOH on
November 5, 1985. The co~pletion of all three projects is a condition
for the new housing loan, Shelter for the Urban Poor II (008, 3S
amended by the Implementation Agreement). The $10 million reprogrammed
from the Private Sector Shelter program (007) will be augmented by $15
million for a total of $25 million plus a $7.5 million GOH
contribution. This new housing loan has not y~t been implemented. It
is anticipated that the new $42.5 million Shelter for the Urban Peor II
(008) will begin in 1987 - after the completion of the three existing
programs.
2. Urban Upgrading Project
Of the three programs presently in operation, Urban Upgrading
(006) is the most simple in design, has had the lea~t problems, and is
generally considered successful. The manner in which this program is
implemented is designed to include community involvement, private
sector participation, and cost recovery.
The Urban Upgrading Project began with the identification of project
areas. Social promoters in thp two cities, Tegucigalpa (CMDC) and San
Pedro Sula (MSPS), identify those low income neighborhoods th~t are
interested in installing potable water, sewer, or pavement in their
communities. Once the priorities are set and a commitment is made to
proceed, the eligibility of the project is determined based on
technical and social criteria. Social criteria include income,
environmental soundness, conformity to the city's urban plan, and a
resolution of any land tenure problems. Technical criteria include
engineering and economic feasibility and efficiency.
The Municipality of Tegucigalpa contracts-out the construction phase
of the project to private firms. The Municipality in San Pedro Sula
has used both contracting out and direct administration, although the
recent experiences of the city have been with direct administration
only. The municipality's Implementation Unit then requests bids from a
list of pre-qualified private construction firms. The bids are
analyzed by an independent committee which receives no compensation for
its work. The committee judges the bids and awards the contract, on the

14

basis of technical reports prepared independently by the engineering
office of the municipality and a private contractor, to the lowest
bidder. The legal departm~nt of the municipality then prepares the
contracts. Separate contracts are awarded for the construction and the
supervision of the work. The engineering department of the
Implementation Unit monitors the contracts and performs periodic
inspections. This latter function is supported by technical assistance
provided by an AID/RHUDO engineer.
Once the work has been completed and the final costs are known, the
Cadastre Department provides the basic data (land areas, current
property values, etc.) to the Betterment Tax Unit which then reassesses
the properties benefitting from the project in accordance with agreed
upon formulas. The Betterment Tax Unit then distributes the final
costs to the property owners in accordance with the benefits received
as evidenced by the reassessment. The final cost per property owner is
then sent to water utility for billing in conjunction with the regular
water bill. Terms are 12 years to pay at an annual interest rate of
17%. The beneficiaries pay the bills to the Aut~nomous Municipal Bank
(BANMA) in the case of Tegucigalpa or to the Water and Sewer Authority
(DIMA) in San Pedro Sula. AID reimburses the municipalities for about
75% of the total cost of these projects.
3. Housing Programs
(a) Housing Construction
The other two programs, Shelter for the Urban Poor (005) and Private
Sector Shelter (007) are housing loans designed to build low cost
housing in urban areas for sale to the poor (less than median income).
Shelter for the Urban Poor (005) has been the mor~ successful of the
two, but has experienced many serious setbacks which have rendered tha
program less than a total su,cess.
The housing programs are implemen~ed by INVA. Initially~ INVA selected
the site for a low-cost housing project, determined the type ~nd number
of units to be ~uilt, designed the project, prepared the technical
reports, and called for bids from a list of previously pre-qualified
private con~truction firms. Once the low cost bid was accept~d,
construction of the project was undertaken with financial advances from
AID and interim financing provicied by INVA. Upon completion, INVA
assumed the task of financing a~d selling the units. The H~to de
Enmedio and the La Paz prOjFcts w~re financed in this way. This
procedure proved unsatisfactory since the private construction firm
incurred no risk whatsoever, nor did they put up any front money, such
as bid bonds or performance suretie~. Profits were obtained without
monetary investment or risk.
Beginning with the EI Sitio project in Tegucigalpa, the implementation
of the nelivery system was modified to remedy this situation. INVA,
with AID assistance, institu~ed a "turnkey sy~tem". Initially, INVA
designs the program under this system, identifies localities for
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prospective projects, and determines the type and number of housing
units to be built. It then advertises that it will accept proposals
from private firms to develop and build a project along the lines
Jpecified. INVA evaluates the proposals and selects the lowest cost
proposal for implementation. A contract between INVA and the
developer/builder is negotiated, which stipulates the terms and
conditions under which the project is developed and built. The private
developer/builder selects the site of the project, obtains the land,
designs the project, obtains his own construction financing, and builds
the project. INVA monitors alld inspects the work throughout the term
of the project. When the project is completed, INVA receives the
housing units, sells them, and provides mortgage financing. Twenty
year mortgages are given to eligible low-income families at a 12X
annual interest rate. As of September 30, 1986, the Shelter for the
Urban Poor has provided these outputs: 801 serviced lots, 1,623 basic
houses, and 550 one bedroom units.
(b) Home Improvement Loans
In addition to providing low-cost housing, the program also
provides home improvemE1t loans to those low-income families who have
purchased a lot or housing unit from INVA. These loans have been
available in three forms: cash loan; material loans from INVA
warehouses; material loans at fixed prices from private suppliers. The
loans are made for 5 years at 15X interest. As of September 30, 1986,
INVA has made 1,496 home improvement loans under this program.
(c) Private Sector Shelter Program
The least successful of all three housing programs has been the
Private Sector Shelter Program (007). This program was initially
administered by FINAVI. The program was initiated by the Government of
Honduras providing interest-free financing of $5 million to private
construction companies in order to produce low income housing in
Tegucigalpa and San PedrQ Sul~ b~ginning March 1981. The financing
passed through FINAVI and then through two savings and loan
associations - La Con~tancia and La Vivienda de Sula. The GOH
requested AID assistance after construction was already in progress in
San Pedro Sula and the project sites and plans were completed elsewhere
in the country. AID assistance began in December 31, 1981 when the
loan agreement was signed. RHUDO/CA required that the private
contractors provide some of their own construction financing.
The principal institutions and their responsibilies are:
FINAVI
-

Project coordinatir.n, supervision and
policy.
obtaining both short- and long-term
financing for the Project.
liaison for the Project.
monitoring of HG loan repayment.
regulatory agency and refinancing
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facility for 5&Ls
S&L Associations

- mortgage lending to project
'1eneficiaries.
- work-in~progress inspections.
- construction lending management on
behalf of FINAVI.
- supervision of sales program.

Developers

- construction of units.
- sal~s of units, under contract tu
5&L associations.
- obtaining approval by municipal and
public utilities of units and
infrastruc';ure network!>. (11.M-MD, 1985)

Mortgages to the purchasers of these low-cost housing units were
provided by the S&L associations for 20 years at 19.5% annual intere~t
charges. As of 9/30/86, 3,308 houses were sold whereas more than 5,500
were constructed. (ll.N- AID, 1~86) Consequently, the amount of money
authorized for this program was reduced to $15 million from the
original $25 million with the approval of the amendment to the New
Shelter for the Urban Poor II loan (008). FINAVI has been terminated
by the GOH due to poor performance and financial problems resulting
from the government's involvement in the poorly planned emergency
shelter housing program launched in 1980. Liquidation is being
administered by the Fiduciary Housing Fund (FOVI) of the C~ntral Bank.
D. Economic Analysis
1. Overall Performance of Housing Programs
This section provides economic indicators of the performance of three
programs. More specifically, we will attempt to provide measurements
of changes in quantity, quality, and spEed of delivery of the various
contracting-out experiences. Indicators of efficiency- least cost,
clearing the market, and goal achievement- will also be con5idered.
Competition as well as changes in public and private sector activity
will be evaluated utilizing the data and information available for such
purposes. It must be borne in mind throughout that none of these
programs u~ed direct administration (public) construction. All three
programs contracted-out their con~truction to privat~ firms. To
expedite the analysis, the salient variables and indicators are
present.ed in summarized form in Table 11-2.
(a) Private Sector Shelter Program (007)
Table 11-2, Item 3 indicates that all three prGgrams required more time
to complete than planned. The Private Sector Shelter PrograM (007)
required l'I~ore than two and a half times as long to complete than
anticipatej. The Shelter for Urban Poor (005) required twic~ ~s much
time to completp. as programmed and Urban Upgrading needed 63% more time
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than planned to complete. None of the three were, therefore, delivered
un schedule. Moreover, the Private Sector Shelter ~rogram was reduced
by nearly 40Y. and required more time for completion than the other two
programs.
How is this inability to deliver on schedule eKplained? Looking first
at the Private Sector Shelter Program (007) we see that the program was
successful in constructing the units at a rate eKceeding that of the
other two program (item 4, table 11-2). Whereas this program hac
produced 82Y. of its programmed housing units as of September 1985, it
was unable to sell them as fast as the other two programs (item 5,
Table 11-2). Among other things, the sale prices for units in 1985
were higher than anticipated in 1981 (item 7, Table 11-2). Its
mortgage interest rate was also higher than thut of the other two
programs (item 6, Table 11-2), and consequently it was obliged to sell
25Y. of the housing units constructed to families which did not qualify
-- families with incomes higher than the regional median (item 8, Table
11-2). Cost recovery, consequently, was not achieved and mortgage loan
delinquencies were an astrorlomical 57Y. as of September, 1985 (item 7,
Table 11-2). As late as September, 30, 1986, only 3,308 units of more
than 5,500 were sold. (11.J- AI~, 1984)
(b) Shelter for the Urban Poor (005)
This program also required more time for completion than planned, more
than twice as long (item 1, Table 11-2). In this case, however, t~ere
were problems with constr·uction with some housing such as case units
eKceeding production targets while others such as serviced lots fallina
way behind schedule (item 4, Table 11-21. More of the constructed
housing units were sold in this program than in Private Sector Shelter,
63Y. vs. 43Y. (item 5, Table 11-2). A greater percentage of the planned
families to be assisted were provided with low-cost housing and this is
partly eKplained by the lower mortgage terms, 20 years at 12% intere5t
of this program ys. the 20 years at 19.5Y. interest of the Private
Sector Shelter Program (item 6, Table 11-2). Becaus~ the cost of these
housing units increased over the years due to an inability to meet
targ~ted goals in a timely manner (item 9, Table 11-2) and because only
7Y. of purchasers are above the median income (i~em 8, Table 11-2), the
mortgage and home delinquency rates exceeded that of the Private Sector
Shelter Program (item 7, T~ble 11-2). DelinqUEncy rates of 71Y. for
mortgag~s and 81Y. for home improvement loans (item 7, Table 11-2),
imply that cost recovery will probably be unattainable in this program.
In both the Private Sector Shelter Housing Program and in Shelter for
the Urban Poor, the following shortcomings of the contracting-out
eKperience have been noted:
a. Difficulties and time lost in improving the institutional
performance of INVA.
b. Difficulties in implementing t~e new "turnkey system" specially in the El Sitio project.
c. Financing at rates of interest significantly below INVA's
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cost of raIsIng the money to lend.
d. Excessive delegation of responsibili~y to private contractorsespecially in site selp.ction and project design.
e. Failure to r~cogniz~ and deal with monopolistic dimensions
operating in the private sector.
f. Contracting-out of construction with inadequate prov151~n
made for sales, mortga~e financing~ and collection.
g. Impro~er design and monitoring to ensure that the targeted
low-income population benefitted. (10.C- Rourk, 1986)
Among other things, this comparative analysis demonstrates that similar
institutional delivery systems fail (01' succeed) for similar reasons.
(c)

Urban Upgrad i ng (006)

{his program is considered a succe~s by most evaluators of these three
urban housing/service programs. With respect to speed of delivery,
this program performed well requiring only 50~ more time to complete
than the two housing program designed to improve the living conditions
of the urban poor (item 3, Table 11-2). As one AID study notes, on5ite construction was completed far ahead of either off-site
construction or municipal de~artmental actions to valorize properties,
distribut~ costs, or edu~ate beneficiaries on the need to repay
investments. The speedy construction on-site is attributed directly to
the use of contracting-out in Tegucigalpa:
In part the ability of the municipalities to complete on-site
construct ion on a sc:ale far outpacing the other' components was due
to the municipalities contracting out both the construction and
supervision of the work. This mode of operation permitted the
municipalities to complete a larger number of sub-prOjects in a
relatively short period of time, thus enhancing the positive
impacts of the program in delivering basic infrastructure to the
low-income neighborhoods. (11.K- AID, 1985: 22)
However, coordination between contractors and municipal departments or
entities or among municipal entities remained a problem.
Sales of these services, potaule water, sewage disposal, and pavement,
are not a problem because of the way the program is designed.
Commitments to buy are made by the community of beneficiaries before
construction begins, as explained abov~. However, promises to pay and
actual payment are not one and the same. Only 30% of the families
scheduled to be benefitted by this program were so served as of
September, 1985 (item 4, Table 11-2). This is the lowest rate of
delivery of ali three pru:rams. Again the high interest rate of 17%
partially explains this performance (item 6, Table 11-2). There is no
data on the portion of ineligible beneficiaries in this program and ~e
may presume that only low-income families have been served. This
assumption is supported by the fact that 67X of the low-income families
who have benefitted from this program who agreed to pay for the
services defaulted as of September 1985 (item 7, Table 11-2).
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Included among the reasons cited for its less-than-anticipated
are the following:

~esults

a. Difficulties and time lost in improving the institutional
performBnce of CMDC and MSPS.
b. The fact that "San Pedro Sula has never fully accepted the idea
of contracting out of the construction work" and prefers to
utilize direct construction.
c. Failure to coordinate rapid construction of projects by private
cuntractois with public support services from cadastre
departments and SANAA hook-ups.
d. No provision made for the funding of "off-site" connections
needed to make projects operational.
e. Cost of services and finance charges in e~cess of ability of
low-income beneficiaries to pay. (11.K- AID, 1985)
2. Cost Comparison of Upgrading Projects
Our prelimi~ary attempts at obtaining comparative information on low
income housing and what we have learned is presented in this section of
the report. We deal with Urban Upgrading (006'. Since this assistance
is intended to be continued under the new Shelter for the Urban Poor II
project (as amended), it would be a logical choice for comparative
investigation. As we ilave noted elsewhere in this chapter, comparison
of different administrative systems in terms of costs is made more
difficult because of differences in data colle~tion techniques. In
direct administration or force accounts such items as overhead, certain
personnel costs, depreciation, and other items are not accoynted for,
or, if they are, unrealistically so. Even in contr~cted pl'ojects,
similarity of duta is a problem.
Unfortunately, data are not
collected and recorded in way that facilitates this analysis in
Honduras in Urban Upgrading. Our preliminary attempts at data
collection for cost comparisons revealed a number of obstacles which
will make the task a difficult one. To begin with, engineers and noneconomists do cost estimation and data collection. As seen in Table
11-3 below, engineers use unit costs of construction. Material, labor,
depreciation, ta~es, and profits are obscured in the process. In
addition, CMDC does not use the same format for project cost
accounting as SANAA. While engineering records are in good order, the
ac~ouncing departments are less well organized.
Consequently, many
actual costs are obscured or not recorded and cost comparisons as well
as analyses are e~tremely difficult under these conditions.
In this study, we have attempted to compare a select sample of six CMDC
projects, three direct administration (public construction) and three
contracting-out of construction to private firms. For only two
projects were we able to obtain cost dat~ for comparison. In addition,
no attempt was made to ~ompare these two projects with one of direct
administration from SANAA. Comparisons between SANAA projects and AIDCMDC projects would be most productive and are recommended for future
investigations.
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The two projects selected for cost comparisons were "Oscar A. Flores"
(contracting-out> and "San Jose" (direct administration> in
Tegucigalpa. The Oscar A. Flores project was for potable water and
sew~r3ge whila San Jose was only d sewerage project.
Cost figures were
adju~ted accordingly so that only those costs incurred in sewage
SystE~'S construction were compared;
The direct administration San Jose project was undertaken one year
later than the Flores project and the 'osts or the earlier project
should be increased by about 5X to account for inflation. This,
however, was not done since it did not significantly alter our
preliminary test. CMDC engineers stated that the two projects were
similar in all other respects.
Table 11-3 below lists the unit cost comparisons of the two project,s.
Most notable is the wide variation of costs such ~hat virtually no two
are identical. Determinations of concrete costs are not estimated in
the same way. In many cases, such as excavation, installation, and
fill-in, direct administration San Jose costs were nearly twice that of
the contracted-out project. Even a simple comparison of costs like
this one, therefore, is useful. Why do such big differences in cost
occur in similar projects using similar technology, ~aterial, and
equipment? It would appear that ther~ are significant CO$~S associated
with direct admini~tration that do not occur in contracting out.
In addition to unit costs calculated by engineers, CMDC also records
glot-al costs on its urban upgrading pr"ojects. These costs are little
more than unit construction costs rearranged and augmented with
miscellaneous other expenses - most of which are estimated. As seen in
Table 11-4, construction costs of a project calculated in this way vary
from project to project instead of being a constant portion as might be
expected. The contracting-out project Oscar A. Flores construction
costs were only c~lculated at 65X of total project costs whereas the
directly administered San Jose project construc~ion costs were
estimated to be BOX of total project costs. CMDC pays approximately
741. of total project costs whereas private constru~tion costs in the
Oscar Flores project were less than this amount.
The San Jose project listed no supervision costs and its fees to the
city for connecting to the main sewerage network were only 6X of total
cost while the Oscar Flores project paid lOX of a much larger total
cost for these services. Thus, the questions arise, was there no
supervision of direct administration projects or were these costs
simply not recorded? Does the city charge privat~ contractors more
than the CMDC to tap into its infrastructure?
In addition to focusing investigation on working hypotheses,
compar~tive studies of cost can provide measurements of the degree of
privatization that has occurred. In urb~n upgrading, contracting-out
to private enterprises represents about 65X of projects and the
remainder is public, at least in this one comparison.
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Another finding of this comparison is that the contracting-out project
provided sewerage facilities to the urban poor at a lower cost per
family and per meter of system. Contracting-out Oscar A. Flores
provided this service for Ll,195 per family and L150 per meter while
the directly administe~ed San Jose pr~ject provlded a similar service
for Ll,386 per family and L181 per meter of system. If 45 percent of
the projects, even with contracting-out, are still public, major cost
reductions may not realistically be expected in many cases. For
example, more efficient private production may reduce construction
costs by lOX which may be offset by increased supervision costs and
public fees in excess of these savings. Likewise, the law requires
only that the lowest bidder gets the contract whether the bids are true
least cost or not.
3. Municipality of San Pedro Sula (MSPS)
In San Pedro Sula urban upgrading is handled by the Municipal
Directorate of Water IDIMA) of the MSPS. It functions very
independently from the MSPS. Its almost exclusive mode of operation is
direct administration to upgrade about 75 marginal neighborhoods in and
around San Pedro Sula. Of these 75 neighborhoods only five received
direct funding assistance from AID; another new five neighborhoods are
re~eiving assistance through the Employment Generation Program. DIMA
has cancelled its other relationship with AID because the Housing
Guaranty Loan Program required a 17% interest on the loan which is much
higher than DIMA wanted to pay.
DIMA used contracting out earlier, but has used exclusively direct
administration since 1984. The reason for the reliance on direct
atministration is a belief by DIMA executive officers that direct
ad~inistration is cheaper, faster, and more efficient. Also, DIMA
bel5~ves that contractors charge excessive administrative costs and
charge profit on direct costs in excessive amounts. Although DIMA was
unable to provide specific data to substantiate this position, it is
instructive to explore the rationale.
The following seven items are typical of a contract. The items are
listed as a percentage of both contractor (direct) cost ~s well as a
percentage of those costs for DIMA on the same item.

CONTRACTOR
1. Preliminary expenses

5X

2X

2. Materials

55

50

3. Manual labor

20

15

4. Miscellaneous

5

5
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5. Equipment

15

10

Total Direct Costs

100

82

6. Administration

25

7. Profit

25

Total Direct and Indirect Cost

150

82

EKplanation
1. Preliminary expenses. DIMA has few preliminary costs but
contractors must solicit bids, make proposals. All this is charged to
the project.
2.Materials.

DIMA orders in lots and can negotiate better prices than

contr~ctors.

3. Manual Labor. DIMA is able to get manual labor faster, cheaper, and
from ~he community.
4. Miscellaneous. No differences.
5. Equipment. DIMA can negotiate rental equipment at lower costs than
contractor because th~ latter uses hIS own equipment. Contractor has to
charge more because of depreciation.
6. Administration. Contractor charges 25 % on all direct costs. Here,
DIMA fails to takp. into account their administration costs
which are likely to be similar.

.

7. Profit. Contractors charge profits but DIMA does not.
A rough calculus based upon these partial data gained from discussions,
and r.al<ing into account the 25 % DIMA administration costs not
included, suggests that the contractor costs are substantially greater.
However, one must be careful with interpreting these ineKact numbers.
TMe most striking feature of DIMA is that it is convinced of the
soundness of this approach, is content wi~h the approach, and will most
likely use this approach in the future.
E. Workable Competition in the Private Sector
In this section of the r~port we will add~e5s the question of private
sector competition and its impact upon the three Mission programs in
low-income housing and public services. To begin with, workable
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competition is like contracting out, a middle position along a spectrum
from pure competition to pure monopoly:
Pure Competition------Workable Competition------Pure Monopoly
Private------------------Contracting Out------------Public
Sector
Sector
We would e~pect to find that, everythi~~ else equal, the greater the
private sector competition, the better thp performance of the
contracting-out delivery system in the three projects under
investigation. However, mor~ contracting-out to a non-competitive
private sector is not an optimum solution and could even be expected to
yield poorer results than direct administration (production) by the
monopolistic public sector.
Although the evidence is sketchy, this hypothesis is supported by the
experiei1ce of the Mission's low-income housing ~nd public services
projects. Unquestionably the Private Sector Shelter Program (007) was
the worst performer of the three, building high-cost houses which
couldn't be sold except at a loss resulting in the decapitalization of
FINAVI and its ultimate demise. The private sector firms involved in
this program were also the least competitive. In three of the five
sub-projects of ~his program, the private fi-ms were vertically
integrated through interlocking directorates among suppliers,
builder~/developers and savings and loan associations.
La Constancia
savings and loan association owners also owned two construction firms,
La Promotora and La Constructora. Likewise, La Vivienda de Sula owned
Honducas, the construr.tion firm which built San Jorge and La Mora. In
addition, the building supply firms are owned by the same interests
that own the S&Ls. These owners also had political connections with
the Government of Honduras which began the program before the Mission
assumed financial responsibility. There apparently was no bidding
process involved, no community or public involvement in site selection
or project design, and only minimal private financing of the
contracting-out construction phase of the projects. Private, riskless,
monopolistic profits were made on land deals, interest-free loans, and
construction. Also, there is some evidence that the contractors were
able to divert a considerable amount of the initial $5 million in cash
from the Central Bank, in the form of interest-free construction
financing funds, from the supplying of labor and materials.
Losses of the savings and loan associations, which assumed the credit
risk, are being reduced ~y the current activities of FOVI-which has
replaced FINAVI. FOVI is presently engaged in selling the unsold
housing units constructed and discounting the mortgages of units
already sold.
The Shelter for the Urban Poor Program (005) fared somewhat better than
the Private Sector Shelter Program (007), in part, because the private
sector participating was more competitive. Site selection, competitive
bidding, and project design and monitoring were instituted at the start
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and monitored by INVA. Problems surfaced, however, once the "turnkey
system" was introduced with EI Sitio project. Site selection, quality
control, and project design responsibilities were delegated to the
private contract~r giving rise to a multitude of problems which
culminated in an inability to ~ell the units or collect on the
mortgages. In this case, t:,e develtiper owned the site~ and the project
was intended to hp.ad off further squatter invasion on the land.
Developed control of siting resulted in problems of both poor
transportation and infrastructure. In addition, poor
coordination/designation of responsibility among INVA/SANAA/developer
resulted. As a consequence, there was inadequate drainage (and pretesting of soil drainage), inadequate water and sewer lines. Although
the priv~te contractors were obliged to obtain their own financing
under this system, the participating banks adopted a highly
conservative position with respect to risk in these ventures. As a
result, only the wealthiest, most liquid developers were financially
able to participate in the projects. Thus did monopoly elements enter
the process.
Moreover, while INVA is, by law, required to accept the lowest bid from
qualified private construction firms, there is no legal pbligation that
these bids be competitively cost efficient or that they correspond to
any standard reference costs. The particular engineering cost
budgeting utilized in the bidding process obscures the true material,
labor, and depreciation costs - to say nothing about profit. In
response to this state of affairs, INVA has divided many of its
projects into sub-prOjects and has awarded a number of private firms
contracts within the same projects. In the p~ocess, lowest cost
bidding is compromised. Contracting-out of construction to the private
sector under the "turnkey system" has many advantages, but the "bugs"
must be worked out. As a general guide, the entity which is
responsible for selling the housing units should also be responsible
for site selection, project design, and ~uality control. An unworkable
division of responsibilities presently exists. Bidding, also, should
be so designp.d as to ensure least cost production, not lowest cost bid.
In the cost-plus contract, the contractor is reimbursed for all costs
plus a fee; the government assumes practically all of the attendant
risks. Finally, sold units currently up to date on mDrtgage payments
und not constructed units should b~ the measure of program progress and
success. The gist of all these is that if there is no incentive to
produce at competitive least cost but only to produce at lowest bid
(cost plus), the units will not be built at the lowest cost and will
not be able to be sold to low-income families.
The Urban Upgrading Program (006) has been generally considered the
most successful of the Missions low-income housing/public services
programs. Strictly speaking, it is not comparable to the other
programs and delivers a distinct product as noted earli~r. This
project, like others, contracts out to private firms the construction
of water, sewerage, and pavement projects for the low income families
of Tegucigalpa and San Pedro Sula. The procedures used in this
program, however, are superior inasmuch as there is more community
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involvement, more control ~ver design and project supervIsIon, and a
superior bidding procedure. There also exists competition for this
program f,'om publicly direct administered production of public works.
Both CMDC and MSPS as well as SANAA produce similar projects which
serve as a reference for Mission contracting-out projects under this
program. They help to ~nsure that fow private bids at less approximate
costs of =onstruction by public entities. Competition from the private
or public sector has the same effect as competition among private firms
only. It is possible that bureaucratic inefficiencies may be no
greater than normal competitive profits in such a case.
Despit& the relative success of the Urban Upgrading Program, a number
of similar problems exist. As pointed out above, off-site works,
prOj2ct delays, and delinquencies in the collection of billings render
the program less than an unqua:ified success. Again, the entity
responsible for sales and cost col.ection should be the same as the one
used in site selection, project design, and s~~ervision. Perhaps this
project could be improved by reconsidering the contracting-out of
supervIsIon. The key to contra~ting-out is to properly design the
program or project and divide responsibilities clearly so as to achieve
goals and objectives. This design and divisi~n can be learned from
experience and comparative cost-benefit studies. That the communities
agreed to pay for the services and then became delinquent on billings
indicates that they either cannot payor refuse to pay.
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TABLE 11-1
HOUSING CHARACTERISTICS IN HONDURAS
1986
(perce~tages)

Metro

Urban

Rural

Distribution of units by location

21

9

70

Distribution of units by building
materials:
permanent
semi-permanent
improvised
Total

78
16

46
29
25
100

12

100

54
51
16

83
34
39

53
33

86

6
100

Percentage of units with
adequate infrastructure:
permanent
semi-permanent
improved

5"/

Distribution of units by tenure:
owned
rented or leased
squatters
Total

38
35
27

Source:

71
16

100

14
100

16
61

14

100

Rourk, Phillip, et al., "Developing a Housing Finance
Strategy for Honduras." The Urban Instituta for USAID
Project 3597, June, 1986.
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TABLE 11-2
SUMMARY OF USAIDIHONDURAS URBAN SHELTER PROGRAMS:
FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC INDICATORS
URBAN
SHELTER FOR
PRIVATE SECTOR
UPGRADING URBAN POOR (005) SHELTER (007)

FINANCIAL!
ECONOMIC INDICATORS

(006)
1- Financing

AID

$10,000,000

$10,500,000

15,235,140

16,487,000

225,000

1,370,000

(1)

crotal)

($25,000,000)
15,000,000
17,075,000

2. Remaining AID

Funds

(1)

17,075,000

3. Years Needed

for Project
Completion (1)

6.S

--------------

Years Planned
for Completion

4=1.63%

6.5
3= 2.17%

6.5
2.5= 2.60'l.

4. Constructed

Output
Planned Outputs
Serviced lots
Core units
Basic hOuses
Hom£' Irnprov.
loans
Families
Assisted

111/2000=6%
9399/3100=30%

579/2170= 27%
1537/1310=117%
5501860 = 6'+%
1241/3000= 41%

5511/6721 =82%

3907/6000=65%

20400/34600=59%

609/972= 63%

2357/5511=43%

5. Sold Outputs (2)
Constructed
Outputs
6. Mortgage &

loan interest
rate (4)
7.

17% (12 yrs)

12% (20 yrs)

~9.5%

(20yrs)

Loan Delinquencies
Mortgages
Home Improv. Loans
Urban Upgrading $328,602
482,143= 67%

8. % Houses or
Servic:es sold

1516/2138=71%
1007/1241=81%

1334/2360=57%

28
to families
above median
income.

N/A

7%

25%

Programmed Unit
Cost in 008, 1984 (4)
9. Programmed unit
costs in projects
Services lots
Core units
Basic houses
Home Improv. loans
10.Host Government
Employment 1981-86
II.Host Government
Deficit 1981-86

$2486/1500=1.66
3576/2500=1.43
5827/3500=1.66 5827/3800=1.53
1122/500 =2.24
+3000(5~)

(6a)

+210 (5b)
(6b)

12.Private Employment
1981-86 (7)

Ij,OOO(est)

+15,500

13.Nat'l Income 81-86

$30 million

$33 million

(5c)
(6c)
+11,80e
$34 mi 11 ion

14.Actual Cost
~ecovery/

Cost Recovery
Expected
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)

(8)

2,191,000

=

From files of USAID/Honduras-Housing
Audit of Honduras Housing Guarantee Program, Jan. 22, 1986.
(Figures as of Sept., 1985).
El Sitio Project only.
AID Project Papers 005, 006, 007 and 008
5A - CMOC+SANAA employment change;
58 - INVA employment change;
5C - FINAVI employment change
6A - CMDC+SANAA deficits;
68 - INVA deficit;
6C - FINAVI deficit
Project Paper 005, 006, 007 target employment increases assuming the projects are completed in 1986 (007 15,000
estimate based upon 005 criteria 10 jobs PQr $10,000
investment)
Project expenditures (assumed expended by Dec. 1986)
X multiplies of 2. Multiplier of 2 obtained from
Economic Effects of Housing Investment (AID, Urban Institute
1984). Rounded to nearest million.

•
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TABLE II-3
UNIT CONSTRUCTION COST COMPARISONS OF TWO URBAN UPGRADING PROJECTS
CONTRACTING-OUT VS. DIRECT ADMINISTRATION
OSCAR A. FLORES
SAN JOSE
(CONTRACTING-OUT)
(DIRECT ADMINSTRATION)
UNIT
UNIT QUANTITY
UNIT PRICE
QUANTITY
PRICE
Layout
Grading
Excavation
(not classified)
8" concrete tubes
Y connec tors 8" x6"
Installation
8" tubes
Compacting
(select material>
Monholes/metal
covers
Tiedowns of
concrete
Tiedowns of
concrete?
Cement covering
tubes
Hydrostatic test
compacted Fill-in
6" concrete tubes
Installation
6" tubes
Inspection boxes
u
ml
m3

ml
ml
m3

1.90
1.90
15.00

2,870
2,870
4,770

1.67
1.66
26.05

300
437

ml

14.00
24.00

2,870
361

11.80
20.42

282
25

ml

4.85

2,870

6.99

291

m3

13.00

280

16.70

35

u

900.00

30

851.54

6

u

19.00

66
196.80

00.30

IJ

m3

340

m3
ml
m3
ml

468.00
.70
2.10
10.50

12.5
2,870
2,720
1,810

429.86
1.56
5.0
9.37

19.7
291
101
30

ml
u

4.10
118.30

1,810
361

4.72
111.81

30
30

= unit
= linear

meter
cubic
meter
=

Note~

Only those units common to both projects were compared,
they were, however, equal to about 95Y. of construction
costs.

Source: CMDC fi les

30
TABLE II-4
GLOBAL COST COMPARISON OF TWO URBAN UPGRADING PROJECTS:
CONTRACTING-OUT VS. DIRECT"ADMINISTRATION
OSCAR A. FLORES
SAN JOSE
(AID CONTRACTING-OUT) (DIRECT ADMINISTRATION)
LM
Y. TOTAL
LM
Yo TOTAL
co::;r
COST
1.
2.
3.

4.
5.

6.

7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

15.

16.

(1)
(2)

Cost of
431,277
con=truction
Materials-AID
Materials-CMDC
Cost of Supervision
Cost of Design AID
Cost of Design At1DC
Pro jec t
Registration
Administrative
Expenditures (2)
General Expend.
Finance
Fee for connection to City
System
Deed transfer
SANAA
Urforseen Expenses
Total cost of
project
662,783
No. family
connections
361
Linear meters
2,870
Average cost per
family
1,195
(not counting
interest charges)
Average cost per
meter
150

65
06

92,867

80
02

05

(1)

08

08

(1)

(1)

06

03

10

06

(1)

01

100

117,813

100

67
513
1,386

181

Less ~han 1/2 of lY. of project costs.
Estimated at lOY. of the combined costs of construction,
supervision, and design

Source: Files of CMDC

-- )(
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CHAPTER 3
PRIMAnv SCHOOL CONSTRUCTION
A. Background
The Honduran educational system suffers from some serious problems that
appear at times to be overwhelming. The major problems relate to rural
educational delivery systems, access of the rural population to
schools, retention and desertion of school age children, deficient and
non-existent rural schools, and under-trained rural primary school
teachers.
The Ministry of Public Education (MOE) is well awa"e of these problems.
Considerable public expenditure~ are made in public education
representing over 25% of the national budget. Recurrent costs are high
in relation to outputs. Educational internal efficiency rates are low
with considerably high levels of repetition and drop-out rates. The
Ministry is placing emphasis on rural primary school construction,
teacher tlaining, and administration management improvem2nts.
International donors such as AID, the ~crld Bank, and the InterAmerican Development Bank al~ stress rural primary sr.hool education.
There is consensus on the nuclearization concept in which older
students in grades 3-6 go to a central school. International donors
have paid a good deal of attention to school construction.
The Ministry of Public Education uses the direct administration
procedure for school construction of rural primary schools and
contrnct.ing out for larger urban schools. School construction is
handled in the Directorate of School Construction within MOE. In
addition, each of the donor agencies is contained within the MOE in
terms of fund accounting. The reason for these separate "project
units" is that there are slight differences between donors and MOE in
terms of what each is willing to fund from their account. More will be
said on this below.
B. Educational Programs
AID/Honduras has had a long history of supporting rural primary school
construction in Honduras. Loan No. 522-V-027, Loan No. 522-V-031, Loan
No. 522-0119 have had rural primary school construction components.
More recently, ?roject No. 522-0167, Rural Primary Schools, is a four
year project to end in December, 1986 with a $13,850,000 loan and $
1,150,000 grant that is to 1) construct 2,100 new classrooms and
remodel 1,000 classrooms in 7 departments, 2) construct 600 teacher
housing units, 3) construct a teacher training center, 4) provide
teacher training for rural primary school teachers, and 5) set-up an
information and data collecting system within the Ministry of
Education. The amendments changed certain project components.
The newest project, No. 522-0273 Primary Education Efficiency, is
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designed to improve the quality of the primary education syst~m through
educational innovations to reduce dropout and repetition rates, lower
unit costs, improve the quality of instruction, and incrp.a~e academic
achievement. This new project, beginning in late 1986, hus tl',e
following seven components:
1. Textbook writing and printing for all si¥. grades.
2. National In-Service Teacher Training for Primary School
Teachers.
3. Administrative and Policy Analy~is Program, a resear~h division
or "think tank" to assess alternative educationa~ policy
directions.
4. Computerized MOE Management I~formation System. A continu~~ion
and reinforcement of previous activities under the Project
No. 522-0167 program.
5. Testing and EvaluatIon Program for Academic Standards
6. School construction, renovation, and maintenance.
7. Interactive Radio Education Program by Private Sector. (a.cAID, 1986)
This edlJcatior;al reform project has a $22.0 million grant and a
$5.5 million loan over an eight year period.
The other leading international donors in education are the World Bank
and the Inter-American Development Bank. The World Bank supported for
mary years the nuclearization concept and assisted in, building several
thousand classrooms. After a lapse of several years they are now
gearing up to contribute once more, They are presently sponsoring an
educational mapping survey to determine educational construc~ion needs
in the rural areas.
The Inter-American Dev'?lcpment Bank is currently using the "contractirrg
out" method to construct larger high schools, technical institutes, and
teacher training centers. At present they are not building rural
primary schools.
It should be p~inted out that the General Dirp.ctorate of School
Construction (oGCE) is us1ng "contracting out·, for constructing five
larger educational institutes and teacher training centers. However, an
assessment of those pro~edures is not included in this study because
they do not relate to rural primary schools.
C. Institutional Analysis
1. Direct Administration of MOE Construction
The DGCE relies mainly on a direct admInistration approach to build
rural schools. First, it provides a simple school design for rural
areas. It uses a force account reimbursable (FAR) system for school
construction. It calls its system ayuda mutua, or self-help
construction. It prefers to have the local community be involved in
what it calls self-help construction. The local community provides
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land, loc~l materials( sand, gravel),and in-kind labor by community
members. The Mi~jstry can provide skilled masons when necessary,
additional materials, steel, bricks, cement, and whatever other
materials and supplies are required 'that the community cannot provide.
The Ministry also provides a social ·promoter who is to stimulate the
community to get involved in the school construction. This person also
assists in school construction s~pervision.
In other communities that already have schools, the Ministry makes an
inspection of existing schools to determine if they need to be repaired
or upgraded. If it is determined that such repair is needed, the
Ministry follows procedures similar to those described above to solicit
self-help construction.
Since the DGCE attempts to maxImIze the number of schools to be built
or renovated, it prefers strongly the self-help construction concept;
there is an outstanding demand of uver 1,000 communities that have
requested schools and therefore it can exer~ pr~ssure on local
communities for ill-kind labor contributions.
The bGCE has three types of school construction, the prices of which
vary: adobe, brick, and cement block. The community is encouraged to
contribute as much as possible. Und~r the DGCE approach the community
is usually required to provide the skilled mason and transport the
Ministry-supplied materials. (AID provides funding for both the mason
and for transport of supplies to the construction site) Again, the
Ministry of Education is attempting to utilize as many community
resources as possible.
In 1986 the DGCE has constructed 336 classrooms in about 150
communities using the self-help construction method. It takes about 8-9
months to complete. The community provides 45X and t~e MOE 55X of
construction costs. The MOE maintains engineering and supervis!on
control through its 17 engineers and 10 social promoters who visit the
school construction continually.
2. MOE/AID

Constru~tion

Procedures

The MOE/AID Project Unit utilizes both direct administration and
contracting out. The AID Primary School Project No. 522-0167
construction component has a separate project unit. Although
theoretically under the DGCE, it has worked fairly independently. The
unit proceeded independently in using the contracting out method in
1984-86. The whole project is under the General Coordinator for the
Primary Education/AID Project. (8.B- AID, 1980)
The goal of the AID School Construction Project Unit i~ to provide
2,100 new classrooms and to renovate 1,000 classrooms by the end of
1986. The project was to use the self-help approach. By e~rly 1984 the
project output was about two years behind schedule. The principal
reasons were 1) serious delays in obtaining materials approved by the
Proveeduria, and 2) lack of community involvement partially because of
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delays. (8.A- MOE, 1985)
In March, 1984 Amendment No.4 of the AID-MOE Agreement stipulated that
private firms would be contracted to build 1,100 classrooms because of
construction delays. (8.H- AID, 198~) This was meant to be a short term
method used by AID/Honduras and the MOE to achieve the construction
goals in time. Thi~ approach was envis~oned as an emergency measure and
not a fundamental shift in approaches.
By March 30, 1985, according to the MUE evaluation, 1,097 classrooms
had been constructed, representing 52% of th~ project goal. Delays
caused construction costs to rise and made tho:: MOE unable to reach its
goals of 2,100 classrooms. They decided, then, to have the private
sector build 300 classrooms in Yoro Department and another 300 in Santa
Barbara. Another 300 classrooms have been contracted, yielding a total
of 900 classrooms. (8.A- MOE, 1985) The Moe/AID Project Unit will
reach its goal of 2,100 classrooms by the end of 1986.
Forty-five Honduran construction firms were pre-qualified for bidding.
Twel ve construc t ion fi n,s were selected. The MOE provided "predetermined price mechanism" so that bidders did not have trJ submi t
lowest bids, but rather were awarded blocks of classrooms to build.
Therefore, there was no competition per se. Rather, contractors
received contracts on a fixed price plus fee basis, relying on MOE
reference unit prices. Special contracts were written for these twelve
contractors to build the 900 classrooms in Santa Barbara, Yoro,
Comayagua, and Intibuca Departments. Some of the basic agreements of
interest in contracting out taken from the document "Contractual Base;;"
are:

o

Contract was to perform using pre-determined price
mechanism. Administrative and contingency funds were added as
well as a regulated profit margin.

a

Packages or groups were given to each contractor in the same
locale within a given department.

a

Fixed price contracts were used based on the pre-determined
costs. No cost reimbursement mechanism was used.

a

A 20Y. guarantee bond was required. This bond was required to
be held with a local surety or insuranc.e institution.

a

A lOY. quality work bond was required and was valid for one
year after terminating the project.

a

A lOY. deduction was made from each payment to cover any
complaints or non-payments. It was paid back after the one
year period.

a
a

A 10% advance was given to the contractor.
A fine of L500 was assessed against the contractor for each
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calender day delay. (8.E- MOE, 1984)
In total 19 contracts were written with 12 construction firms. There
was an average of about 50 classrooms per block and per contractor.
The housing units component was to provide housing units for rural
primary school teacher~ in communities requesting teachers housing to
encourage teachers to live in the communities. Modest tea~her housing
units were built using the same self-help construction approach. This
component has been less successful, in part because communities
r~questing these units have not been forthcoming in assisting in
ct;)r.st.l"\jr.t.ion.
The original project goal was to build 600 teacher housing units. Only
seven units were cc.nstrllc.ted. The rest of this component has been
stopped and project funds reprogrammed into school construction. The
initial assessment of teacher housing needs and desire was not
justified.
3. Direct Administration and

Con~racting

Out

Direct administration is the norm for the MOE/DGCE. Contracting out
was utilized f0r a two year period only in order to speed up
~onstructior..
TherEfore, the same procedures of direct administration
were used during this period with considerable duplication of effort.
The perception of an "emergency situation" meant that long-term chanqes
in administrative procedures were not implemented. It is fair to say
that the USAID rUssion to Honduras and the Pro jed Uni t of the Mimstry
of Public Education are convincej of the more cost-effective manner of
self-help construction. This was reiterated in the Project Paper No.
522-0273 Primary Education Efficiency. (8.C- AID, 1986) Even 50, it is
important to assess the advantages and disadvantages of either system.
80th AID/Honduras and MOE officials report that the overall cost
to the MOE is lower using the directly administered self-help approach
to school construction. Yet it is important to assess overall costs,
both direct community costs and in-kind costs in order to make a fair
comparison.
(a) Design criteria
There are no differences between direct administration and contracting
~ut by the MOE.
In both cases, MOE design criteria of the planning
office are used.
(b)

Land

Again there are few differences. Under btith direct administration and
contracting out, land for construction is donated by the community.
However, it was noted by several sources that the communities h~ve less
interest in obtaining land for contractors since there wer~ certain
fears and that the contractors would acquire the land. There are,
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however, no clear examples of this happening.
(c) Promotion
In both ca~es, the Ministry provide~ the c~mrnunity with ~ocial
promoters. There are 10 DGCE and 6 DGCE/AID Prc2ect Unit social
promoters. Their role is to pruvide both guidance and encouragement to
community efforts. Social promoters noted, however, that under the
guidelines of the contracting out relationship they spend about half as
much time in the communities. It would seem that the sense of
involvement of the community and the promoter is less evident in the
contract relationship.
(d) Skilled labor
Under most MOE project guidelines, the MOE obligates the community to
acquire the services of a qualified foreman and mason on their own. The
community must pay for these services. In the case of the AID Project
Unit within MOE, the Unit pays for the skilled masonry person. In the
contract relationship, the contractor pays for the services of t.he
mason. Thus, the community bears an added cost under the direct
administration by the MOE.
(e) Construction Materials
Under direct admin-stration, sand, gravel, and rocks are normelly
provided by the co~munity. How~ver, there are numerous exce~tions to
this policy. The intent by AID and MOE is to maximize com~unity input
and pal"ticipation ana to minimize direct government costs. In the case
of the MOE, even th~ costs of transport of materials to the
construction site is assumed to be a responsibility of the community.
AID funded projects do provide for transport costs. In the case of
contr&cting out, the co~tractor assumES all of these (reimbur5dble)
costs. This is a key factor e)(plainin~1 price and time differentials.
Directly aci:ninistered projects utiliz.ng community self-help require up
to six months for the acquisition of supplies because of the need to
obtain approval f~om the Proveeduria. Contractors can acquire supplies
immediately. Once again, construction delay is money, and the
bureaucratic requirements of the MOE mean additional costs. While it
is not possible to give accurate cost estimates of this addition~l
cost, it does exist.
(f) Administration
In ~he case of directly administered projects there is close
supervision in the conslruction process. There are 80 MOE and 40 AIDfunded Project Unit people --engineers, social promoters, accountants,
architects--who participate in the administrative functions. The
Contractor provides his own personnel. In the contract relationship,
tne AID Project Unit writes contracts, sets bidding procedures, and
supervises the construction. Contracts are fixed fee and there is no
least cost bidding procedure. Supervision could be reduced by as much
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as 50% with contracting out. This is an obvious difference in approach,
and an area for considerable potential cost reductions and lowering of
recurrent costs of the public sector over the long run. However, there
were no reductions in the si~e of the MOE staff as a result of the use
of contracting out, because contracting was viewed as simply an
emergency response and not the modus vivendi of school construction
projects.
(g) Quality of Construction
There are few apparent differences in the quality of the constructed
school under either system. With external supervision by MOE personnel
(in the case of direct administration and self-help) or by a contract
engineer (in the case of contracting) acceptable quality schools are
constructed. One safeguard against poor construction in the case of
contracting is that five percent of the fixed contract amount is
deducted and retained to cover debts and claims brought against the
contractor subsequent to construction.

(h) Maintenance
There are significant differences in the two approaches. Where the
community has been involved in the construction (under direct
administration and self-help) there is a real sense that the school
belongs to them. As a result, commitment to maintenance is higher.
With contracting out, the contractor's responsibility ends with the
completion of the structure and the school is "turned over" to the MOE.
Table 111-1 graphically describes these various arrangements.

(i) Community Labor
Under direct administration, the community provides unskilled labor for
levelling, grading, laying foundations, mixing cement, and hauling
materials, all on an in-kind basis equalling as much as 30-40% of total
classroom construction costs. With contracting out, the contractor
assumes the CJsts of manual labor whether it is derived from the
community or his own crews. That cost forms part of his overall costs.
Thus, the in-kind contribution as a cost reduction to government is
lost under contracting out.
D.

Economic Analysis
1. Background

Between 1974 and 1978, 2,747 clas:~ooms were built in rural areas. At
the time of the signing of the program agreement in 1980, it was
estimated that about 3,000 rural classrooms would be required to
achieve full enrollment of rural priMary age students. (8.8- AID, 1980)
For the years 1980-1985, rural primary school enrollment was expected
to increase by 25% to 387,000 students. To accommodate this increase,
2,100 new classrooms were planned to be constructed and 1,000 existing
classrooms to be renovated over the years 1981-1985. In addition, 600
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teachers' houses were to be constructed. The monthly production target
was 50 classrooms. The program complemented the activities of the
World Bank which constructed 813 additional classrooms.
Joint efforts by these programs and:several others (eg., CARE) were
intended to supply the increasing demand for classrooms in the rural
communities of Honduras. The demand for rural classrooMs was studied
and projected, the necessary supplV was estimated, and financing was
obtained. Initially, AID provided $13,850,000 in loans (40 years at 2%
and 3Yo with a ten year grace period) and $1,150,000 in grants (Table
111-2).
2. Construction Delays and Related Costs
The classrooms and teachers' houses were to be built by the DGCE by
direct administration and utilizing community participation. By March
of 1984 only about 490 classrooms had been completed (Table 111-3).
Initially, the program contemplated the completion of all 2,100
classrooms by 1984 (Table 111-2).
There ~re several reasons for the failul"e of the program to meet its
objectives on schedule. While factors such as the change in government
and the dramatic effects of the 1980-82 recession were important
external factors, so too were factors related to the administrative
approach: implementation problems within MOE and procurement delays in
interactions with Proveeduria were critical.(8.J- AID, 1985)
Most often cited were the material supply problems associated with the
Proveeduria. In many cases, up to six months lapsed between the time
classroom construction material was authorized and delivery to the
construction site. In part, these difficulties were bureaucratic and
had to do with the fact that the Proveeduria is, by law, required to
seek at least three bids for all purchases. These problems also
stemmed from the fact that material purchases for classroom
construction was a new and significantly large task for which MOE had
no prior experience. Finally, the procedure utilized in classroom
construction required a new intergovernmental relationship between two
government entities-- the MOE and the Proveeduria. (8.A- MOE, 1985)
AID restructured the construction phase of the program in March, 1984
with Amendment 4. Under this amendment, the same targets of 2,100 new
classrooms and 600 renovated classrooms were set. Teacher housing was
dropped and $800,000 in additional grants was reprogrammed tu the
program. Most significant of all, for purposes of this report, the
institutional arrangements of the delivery system of the program was
altered from one of classroom construction by direct administration
(and self-help) to one of contracting-out to private firms for the
construction of 900 of the 2,100 classrooms. (8.H- AID, 1984) In March
of 1985, $3,000,000 in additional loans and $600,000 in grants was
added to the program for the construction of 285 classrooms also to be
construction by private firms under contracting-out procedures (8.K-
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AID, 1985). One additional year was added to the program and the
completion date for the program was moved forward to April 1986.
Finally, 100 additional new classrooms were programmpd for construction
bringing the total to 2,200.
Since March, 1985, production of new classrooms intreased at a rapid
pace and much of the time lo~t between 1981 and 1984 was compensated
for as seen in Table 111-4. Approximately 1559 new classrooms were
constructed by 1984 and 2027 new classrooms were completed by November
of 1986. This phenomenal progress has been attributed to the shift to
the delivery system utilizing private construction firms contracted to
build ~ural classrooms for the MOE.
In the switch from direct administration to contracting-out to private
construction of classrooms in 1984, the institutional arrangements of
the program's delivery ~ystem were fundamentally altered as seen also
in Table III-I. By reducing community involvement, this method of
delivery has been able to meet targeted objectives much more rapidly
than the earlier direct administration (self-help) arrangement. In bypassing the Proveeduria for the procurement of materials, much time was
saved. This is reflected in the statistics on work completed in Table
111-4. In comparing time of delivery, therefore, contracting-out was
significantly faster than direct administration. The program required
one additional year and additional financing to meet the targeted
objectives.
3. Cost Comparisons
Table 111-5 lists the projected costs of new classrooms during the
period 1981-85. Initially, it was estimated that a new classroom under
direct administration would cost approximately L10,000. This cost
estimation was based upon 10 representative classroom construction
samples taken in 1979 and projected through the expected life of the
program - until 1985. Included was a 12X per annum inflationary
factor. Community contributions were assumed to equal 24X of direct
costs although these costs varied from project to project, from 9% to
28.6X. (8.D-AID, 1985)
The MOE did not include the value of community contributions since for
the Government of Honduras the opportunity cost of self-help is zero.
In computing true engineering costs, however, the community
contributions should be added as costs-in-kind. The MOE also estimated
that its administrative and financial costs were lOX of direct costs
and these costs also were not considered as project costs and excluded
from the cost calculations for the construction of a rural classroom.
Table 111-6 shows that if th~se two costs, community (self-help)
contributions of L2,400 and indirect costs of administration and
finance of L1,000, are added to the direct costs of "self-help"
construction costs, we obtain a total cost figure of L13,400. The real
costs of direct administration is only L600 less than the fixed price
reimbursed under contracting-out private construction in 1986. In
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addition, if we make adjustments for the 5Y. "future claims" deduction
from the contractors fee, costs are virtually identical!
Consequently, there is virtually no .actual cost difference between the
two delivery systems when all the mon~tary and in-kind costs are
properly accounted for. Thus, the statement tha~ the classrooms built
by direct administration with self-help are 50% cheaper (8S-AID, 1980)
appears to be somewhat misleading. They were cheaper for the project
component, but there was no significant difference in the overall
actual construction costs of the two approaches.
The discrepan~ies about the relative cost efficiency of these two
delivery system is due to a failure to include all relevant costs. In
effect, the self-help, direct administration, constructions utilized
community labor and in-kind material contribution in lieu of a user
fee. Consequently, the money cost of a new classroom to the MOE and
AID was lower than it was under contracting-out of schoolroom
construction to private firms. With the switch to contracting-out,
this community contribution was lost. In one ~~nse, the use of
communi ~~' labor served to avo id (at least minimally) the "free-rider"
problem .::;f a public good: beneficiaries were "charged" for the service.
However, the switch to contracting out meant that the public sector
absorbed these costs, and beneficiaries could avoid the "use charge."
This additional cost burden to government, however, has been assumed in
the loan. Tables 111-7 and 111-8 show that MOE paid private firms
under contracting-out approxh~ately twice as much as AID r~imbursed the
MOE under direct administr~tion for the construction of a similar rural
classroom under this program.
50me of the higher costs und~r c~ntracting out is also due to price
increases to adjust for inflation. This is curious inasmuch as a 12%
inflationary factor was initially built into the projected costs of
construction as pointed out above. Moreover, inflation in Honduras
dUiing the years 1980-1985 did not exceed lOX per year, at best. With
a f!xed price contract based upon an actual cost study ~s was the case
with this program, it is difficult for private construction firms to
reduce costs. Therefore, one way to consider profits is to seek and
obtain increases in the fixed price~ of their contracts.
The shift to contracting-out meant that only half as many classrooms
could be constructed with the same m~ney assistance or that the money
assistance would have to be doubled. AID and the MOE chose the latter
course. In 1984 and 1985, $4.6 million was added to the approximately
$16 million programmed for this purpose. Thus $4.6 million plus the
$1.7 million of the abandoned teachers' housing segment of the program
comes to $6.3 million. By calculating that about 1/4 of the program was
advanced as of March 1984 with the shift to contracting-out, 3/4 of the
program remained to be disbursed - or $12 million. Thus the augmented
financing of $6.3 million provided the needed 50% increase required by
the full cost reimbursement with contracting-out of rural school
construction of classrooms.
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In essence, increased loans were substituted for in-kind community
contributions to the program as a result of the shift to contractingout. The henefit was a faster deli~ery system and a prOject completed,
more or less, on schedule. The cost was a higher monetary expenditure
on the part of the GOH as well as an increased foreign debt.
In conclusion, the experience with both direct ndministration and
contracting-out under the Rural Primary Education Program during the
years 1980-1986 revealed the following:

o

The program r~quired more finances and more time to complete than
originally programmed.

o

The increased time was due to a failure of direct administration with self-help to construct classrooms on schedule.

o

Direct administration utiliz~d community resources and was less
costly to project proponents in monetary terms than contractingout.

o

The increased financial cost of the program was due to the
switch to contracting-out which reimbursed full actua! costs
of construction.

o

With the faster construction contracting-out the project required
only an additional year's extension for completion. Time delay is
money, particlllarly in infrastructural development.

o

When all actual costs, monetary and non-monetary are considered,
the costs of construction of rural classrooms by the two
approaches are virtually identical.
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TABLE I II-I
DIVISION OF TASKS BETWEEN PRIVATE, PUBLIC
AND COMMUN i.TY I N THE
CONSTRUCTION OF RURAL. PRIMARY CLASSROOMS

ASPECTS
OF PROGRAM

DIRECT ADMINISTRATION
(SELF-HELP)
PRIVATE PUBLIC COMMUNITY

Community
Promot ion
Project Design

CONTRACTING-OUT
PRIVATE PUBLIC COMMUNITY

li

)«1>

)(

)(

Land

)(

)(

Material

)(

)(

)(

)(

(2 )

Labor

)(

)(

)(

)(

(2 )

Transport

)(

)(

Tools &. Equip.

)(

)(

Other

)(

)(

Administration

)(

)«3)

)«3)

Supervision

)(

)«4)

)«4)

Finance

)(

)(

)(

)(

)«2)

-------- .. _-----_._--------------------------------------(1)

Comruunity promoters are used in both direct administration and
contracting out of classroom construction. Roughly twice as much
time and rescurces are used in direct administration for this
activity than in contracting-out, according to community promoters
at the Ministry of Education.

(2)

Community contributions of Ll,OOO and construction materials were
eliminated in 1985 for contracting-out but continue for direct
administration construction of classrooms.

(3)

MOE administers the overall project whereas the private firms
administer the construction component only.

(4)

and inspection is done both by the Government (MOE)
and by AID private consultants.
Supervi~ion
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TABLE III-2
FINANCIAL·SUMMARY:
RURAL PRIMARY. EDUCATION
(US$)

PROJECT
AMENDMENT NO. 4
ADDITIONAL
TOTAL
(MARCH 1984) (2)
PAPER (0167)
FINANCING
(JUNE 1980)(1)
( MARCH, 1985) ( 3 )

AID loan

$13,850,000

AID grant
New Classroom
Construction
Project Goal

*

1,250,000
2,100

$3,000,000
800,000

*

600,000
100

$16,850,000
2,850,000*
2,200

Between June 1980 and March 1984, $200,000 in additional grant
money was added to this program

Sources:
(1)
(2)
(3)

Project Paper Rural Primary Education (0167), June 1980.
AID/GOH, "AID Loan No. 522-V-040 and Project No. 522-0167, Project
Amendatory Agreement No.4," March 6, 1984.
Cable AID/Wash to AID/Honduras, March 5, 1985.
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TABLE II 1-3
PRIMARY SCHOOL CLASSROOM PROJECT

AID Loan
522-V-031

1979

19130

1981

1982

1983

1984

130

250

299

299

299

299

40

170

350

530

558

480

1,170

1,782

2,100

World Bank
Schools
This Project
522-0167
Nat'l Program

200

400

600

800

1,000

1,200

Present Stock

13,340

13,219

12,920

12,546

12,199

12,010

TOTAL NUMBER
OF CLASSROOMS

13,670

13,909

14,469

15,165

15,810

16,167

Source:

Project Paper, Rural Primary Education (522-0167), June
1980.
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TABLE 111-4
WORK COMPLETED UNDER PROGRAM RURAL
PRIMARY EDUCATION (0167)
VARIOUS YEARS
DEC. 1982

MARCH 1984

(1)

MARCH 1985

NOV. 1986

(3)

Completed
classrooms

246

255

Additional
classrooms

184

235

Latrines

409

393

Water

169

99

1,559

(4)

2,027

Note: Project Agreement signed 31 July, 1980, Project Implemented
August, 1981.
Sources:
(1)

Mejoramiento de la Educaci~n Rural Primaria: An~lisis de Ejecuci6n Projecto AID/GOH 522-0167, June, 1983.

(2)

Project 522-0167 Construction Component Status as of March
31, 1984 (from files of AID/Honduras).

(3)

Cable AID /Wash to AID/Honduras, March 5, 1985 augmented
financial assistance to the projec~ $3 million additional
loans and $600,000 additional grants.

(4)

From the files of Engineering Dept., USAID/Honduras
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TABLE I II-5
PROJECTED AVERAGE COST PER CLASSROOM
1981~.1985

(Lempi:-as)

PP (1)

CS (2)

1981-82

9,438

1982-83

9,438

9,135

1983-84

9,438

10,117

13,744-AC

1984-85

9,438

10,752

11,598-AA

1986

AC
AA

CB (3)

CB (4)

14,090-AC
11 ,886-AA

= New complete four-sided classroom
= Three sided additional classroom

Sources:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

Project paper, Rural Primary Education (0167), June 1981;
Construction Summary Nov., 1992;
Costos Base por Modulo Tipo, Por Paquete y Por Sistema
Construccion, MDE, 1984;
Costos Base por Modulo Tipo, Por Paquete y Por Sistema
Construccion, MDE, 1985 (anticipated cost reduced
the L10,000 estimate to L9,438.
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TABLE 111-6
COSTS PER 'CLASSROOM
(Lempiras)
1982 (1)
(DIRECT ADMINISTRATION)

1986 (2)
(CONTRACTING-OUT)

L. 6,400

L, 6,103

900

1,315

Labor

1,900

2,773

Other

800*

335

L,10 ,OOC

L.I0,526

2,400

0

L. 7,600

L,10,526

Direct Costs
Material
Tools &. Equip.
Transportation

Sub-Total I
Less: Community
Contribution Equal
to 24% direct cost
Sub-Total I I
Indirect Costs
Administration
Finance

L, 1,000

Project
Sub-Total III

L. 1,000***

L. 3,563

TOTAL

L, 8,600

L,14,089

Plus Community
r,ontr ibut ion

L, 4,800

OVERALL TOTALS

C,13,400

L.14089

Notes:

*

Other direct costs include costs of assistant supervisors,
mechanics, drivers, warehouseman, watchmen, ~'~rnpers,
warehouse rental, contingencies, social security, and fringe
benef it!:;.
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**

Costs to the private construction firm such as administration
overhead, legal, bank finance charges (4 months), and a
"reasonable profit". These costs are estimated at 35~ of
direct costs.

***

Imputed costs to the Ministry of Education are equivalent
to financial operating costs with external funds. Estimated
to be 1~ of direct costs.

Sources:
(1)

"Project Paper Rural Primary Education (0167)," AID, June
1980. Co~t figures based upon 10 representative samples taken
in 1979.Projected costs through 1985 based upon inflation
rate
of 12~ per year.

(2)

"Costas base par Modulo Tipo par Paquete y Sistema
Constructi va' "Mi nistry of Educat ion,1986. Costs based upon
1000 classrooms built prior to 1984, and used to determine
reference costs for t.he units to be produced by contracting out
of construction to private firms (Complete, four sided classroom
figures used here - an average of the four types of construction
used:

1. Cement stabilized adobe walls,
clay tile floors, timber roof
truss with clay tile

3. Concrete block walls,concrete slab floor, woodlouvered windows, timber
roof truss, cement usbestos roofing sheets.

2. Brick walls, concrete floor,
glasslouvered windows, timber roof truss covered with
cement asbestos roofing
sheets.

4. Wood panel walls, concrete
slat floor, wood louvered
windows, timber roof
truss, cement asbestos
roofing sheets.
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TABLE II 1-7
AID REIMBURSEMENT OF·CONSTRUCTION COSTS:
NEW CLASSROOMS UNDER FAR
(Lempiras)

DIRECT ADMINISTRATION
1983

Comp!ete Classroom

(1)

1984 (2)

CONTRACTING-OUT (3)
1985

1986

L 6,000

L 7,850

L 13,744

L 14,090

Addt'l Classroom

5,100

6,475

11 , 598

11 , 866

Latdnes

1,000

1,300

1,956

2,029

600

600

852

866

Potable Water

Source~i· :

(1)

Situacion de Reembolsos de los Proyectos del Pr~stamo
AID 522-V-040 hasta 1 de abril de 1983.

(2)

Costas reembolsables para construccion nueva, Carta de Ejecucion No. 81, 15 de marzo de 1984.

(3)

Costas base par Modulo Tipo par Paquete y par Sistema
Constructivo, MOE, 184 Y 1985.
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TABLE II 1-8
AID REIMBURSEMENT PER UNIT OF CLASSROOM CONSTRUCTED
(Lempiras)

APRIL 1983 (1)

NOVEMBER 1986

One Complete Classroom,
One Latrine, One Potable Water

L. 7,000

L. 16,985

One Complete Classroom,
One Additional Classroom,
One Latrine, One Potable Water

L .12,100

L. 29,680

Note: One extra latrine, an additional L. 1,000; one rain
depository potable water system, an additional L. 600.

Sources:
(1) Situaci&n de reembolsos de los proyectos del pr~stamo
AID 522-V-040, hasta 1 de abril de 1983.
(2) Costas base par modulo tipo, par paquete y par sistema
constructivo, MOE, 1985.
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CHAPTER 4
RURAL ROADS CONSTRUCTION
A.

'ackground

Until recently, the Honduran Government placed a major emphasis on
major paved hi9hways to connect the different regions of the country.
In the 1980s there has been increased interest in feeder and access
roads. The Government attempts to open up new feeder roads and to
rehabilitate old and poorly cor.structed rural trails.
It was estimated by the Ministry of Communications, Public Works, and
Transportation (SECOPT) that there were over 5,000 kilometers of access
roads that are substandard and in various states of need for repair.
SECOPT estimates that over 800,000 people can be affected positively by
upgraded roads (14.A-AID, 1985).
The justification for feeder or access roads is for rural families to
gain better access to primary agricultural markets and to secondary
markets. These roads also allow rural families to gain access to
health, education, and other services.
B. Rural Road Programs
AID/Honduras has been engaged in assisting rural road construction for
at least the last 20 years. More recently, it has assisted with the
following projects:

o

Agricultural Sector I Project No. 522-025
1970-75: agricultural project that had 300 kms of feeder
roads constructed. The Ministry of Communications, Public
Works, and Transportation( SECOPT) had its own equipment and
built the roads themselves using direct administration.

o

Rural Rer.onstruction II Project No. 522-030
1976-80: reconstruction of roads after Hurricane Fifi. Built
and reconstructed 300 kms of roads using direct
administration method by having own equipment and machinery
and also contracting out to private contractors under close
supervision of SECOPT.

o

Rural Trails Project 522-035
1980-1986: construction and rehabilitation of 1,500 kms of
roads. Project winding down as of end of 1986. Uses
contractors who provide machinery and equipment.

o

Rural Roads II Project No. 522-052.
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1987-1990: new project to build or rehabiltate additional
1,000 kms roads in North C,ast, tIle Central Valleys, and th~
Western Highlands. This is. $36.167 million project with AID
$20 million loan, $1.315 million grant, and $14.852 million
GOH contribution. A major feature i~ using some contracting
out for machinery and equipment and additional requirement of
maintenance by the General Directorate of Mainten~nce (DGM).
The additional component for this new project is operation
and maintenance.
Other multilateral donors-- Inter-American Development Bank and the
World Ban~-- also supported SECOPT in rural road construction. The
projects supported by those donors use a system in which the contractor
has much more responsibility for design, construction, quality control,
and final responsibility than with the AID projects.
A rural roads project directly administered by SEC OPT , using national
funds, Inter-American Development Bank loans, and bilateral assistance
from the German and Swiss Governments, is based on manual labor. In
this approach, the SECOPT personnel are much more involved in direct
administration of the project and contract directly for machir.ery and
equipment at the most minimal level. The primary focus of these efforts
is the utilization of self-help community assistance.
Thus, within SECOPT there are three different models of rural road
construction in three separate and non-coordinated project units. To
visualize the relationships among these various approaches, we can
imagine a continuum from strict direct administration to full
contracting out:
O.

Direct Administration Model. Represented by the use of manual
labor ("mano de obra"). Direct administration by SECOPT with
maximum community involvement and maximum SECOPT involvement
in promotion, supervision, quality control.

o

Limited Contracting Out. Represented by projects funded by
AID. SECOPT does direct administration and contracts out only
for machinery and equipment by private contractors. SECOPT
also might contract some other item of work such as subbase
materials and culverts. SECOPT fully responsible for plans,
designs, supervision, and maintenance.

o

Full Contracting Out. Represented by projects funded by the
Inter-American Development Bank and the World Bank. Private
contractors involved in designs, plans, and then full
responsibility for construction. SECOPT plays more distant
role as development administrators. Contractors have more
responsibility for quality of work.
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C. Institutional Analysis
1. Transition to Limited Contrar.ting-Out in SECOPT/AID Unit
The General Directorate of Roads (DGC) of SECOPT has established
project units for its different bilateral and multilateral funded
projects. These project units function independently from each o~her
and devise their own methods of operation. Our concern here is with the
transition of the AID Project Unit.
During the 1970's the SECOPT/AID Project Unit had its own tractors,
machinery, equipment, operators, and supporting 5taff to build and
rehabilitate rural feeder roads. This approach cut costs by involving
in-kind community contributions for labor and digging drainages. First
it reduced costs to the Unit. Second, it increased the community
involvement in the construction process. Third, as a result, it made it
possible to build more ro~ds at the same cost than the other
approaches.
On the other hand, there were several problems with the approach.
First, it took from six months to a year to gain community involvement;
a substantial amount of social promotion was required. Second, the
machinery and equipment was in disrepair and caused delays. Spare parts
had to be ordered through the Proveeduria, and often took as much as
six months for approval. Then, spare parts had to be purchased in the
United States. Once spare parts arrived it took a~other one or two
months to get equipment repaired through government repair shops.
Third, all small scale purchases also had to be made through the
Proveeria, causing further delays. Fourth, the quality of work seemed
to be inadequate.
In addition, in the late 1970s and early 1980s the private sector
construction firms began to pressure for changes in the construction
system in order to allow more private participation in public sector
civil works construction.
In 1980, coinciding with the new AID Loan No. 035, the AID Project Unit
of SECOPT switched fro~ direct administration to a "limited contracting
out" approach.
2. SECOPT/AID Contracting Out Procedures
(a) Preliminary Assessment
SECOPT receives requests for constructing rural roads from the National
Development Plan of CONSUPLANE and from direct requests from different
rural communities. SECOPT and AID are concerned with the need for
rural roads in agricultural areas. This has prompted the construction
of roads No. 035 and 052. The economic justification for such projects
is that there may be economic benefits for the farmers. Once a road has
been approved for preliminary acceptance, a SECOPT and AID engineer
visit the site for initial inspection. They must assess the vehicle
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traffic, pedestrian road use, and other factors. A preliminary
topographical map is made. A second stage is the conducting of a socioeconomic study which takes roughly ~hree months. This ~urvey is
conducted by staff of SECOPT and is used in the preparation of the
parameters for bid procure~ents in subsequent contract bidding (13.0SECOPT, 1985).
(b) Construction Design
In the SECOPT offices, final plans and designs are made for each road
system. These terrain maps are quite superficial and without detail,
allowing for much variations, deviations, and on-the-spot changes. This
ubviously has advantages and disadvantages. The advantage is that there
is the fle~ibility for changes and on-the spot changes. Such
fle~ibility reduces efficiency in equipment management and therefore
increases construction cost and prevents adequate quality control and
monitoring. There can be considerable politi~al pressures for changes,
extensions, and revisions. There nave also been ~ases of contractors
being requested to provide more services than originally plannE~. The
final design plans take roughly two weeks to complete.
SECOPT/AID produced an excellent construction manual for rural roads
in August, 1985. Entitled "Manual para la Construccion de Caminos
Rurales," it provides a good and concise overview of how SECOPT is to
handle AID-funded rural road projects. This document covers ten basic
chapters on the following subjects: 1) organization and responsibility;
2) work relationships; 3) reporting and monitoring; 4) changes and
contract modifications; 5) material control; 6) guidelines for
preparation plans, specifications and cost estimations; 7) geometric
design; 8) drainage design; 9) soils-materials investigation; and 10)
construction specification (13.0- SECOPT, 1985).
According to this manual AID has final responsibility to approve the
design plans, documents, construction contracts, construct:on companies
and the construction awards. Since the SECOPT has similar
responsibility according to the Honduran law, it seems logical from the
institutional and administration point of view that the elaboration of
design plans, specifications and construct\on documents could be
prepared by the private sector and be ~upervised by SECOPT and AID.
The study team examined t~o sets of plans in the SECOPT office. The one
was made by SECOPT (Road Project A,acualpa-Santa Maria-Dept Olancho-EI
Paraiso 43.65 km) and the other by a consultant firm (Road Project San
Francisco de la Paz-Gualaco 32.4 km.) The consultant plan presents a
more comprehensive set of plans (13.A-SECOPT, 1984).
A high quality of design plans is essential to determine accurately the
optimum volume of construction work and to prepare the detailed unit .
price analysis. The construction manual indicates clearly that the most
favorable or feasible method for construction bidding is on the basis
of a unit price unalysis rather than on the basis of partial renting of
construction equipment based on hourly rates.
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(c) Bidding Procedures
SECOPT has prepared a second document, "Documentos de Precalificacion
Reconstruccion de Caminos de Acceso," for pre-qualifying firms and for
establishing the quality required of firms. A series of documents are
required from contractors in order to examine qualifications including
questionnaires, financial statements, and legal status. It is patterned
after the AID Handbook on procedures and the AID RFPs (14.C-SECOPT,
1986) •
.SECOPT also provides to bidders a basic document entitled "Documentos
de Licicacion y Contrato," that outlines bidding procedures, points
system, and evaluation specifications for construction of rural roads.
The bid document contains: the number of roads to be built and their
specifications; specific work plans to be completed; specific designs;
specifications for making offers; and specifications for bonds. There
are four types of bonds: (1) 10.000 Lempiras guarantee at beginning
stating that prices stated will hold for 90 day~; (2) 15X completion
bond that is good for three oionths after construction ends; (3) lOX
special retention bond based on estimated completed execution of the
work; and (4) a bond for 100% amouTlt advanced by the GOH (14.D-SECOPT,
1986).
Contractors are requested to submit a pre-qualification statement. In
the last round of bids, over 30 Honduran firms demonstrated interest in
being pre-qualified; 15 were pre-qualified; and six were selected to
build six blocks.
Normally, rural roads are grouped in blocks. The contr~ctor may bid on
all blocks or partial blocks. SECOPT and AID personnel take contractors
to future construction sites to appreciate the kinds of civil works
required.
SECOPT produces an internal document that specifies the outline and
specifications for the project. The last document produced was entitled
"Reconstruccion Caminos de Acceso Proyectos Selecionados, Grupo de
Envio, No. 10," in July, 1986 for projects in the Departments of
Comayagua, Cortes, and Copan. The document contai~s a socio-economic
jusiification for the project based a project versus no prOjEct
comparison of agricultural prnduction, agricultural prices, yields, and
other economic factors. It contains a very specific and detailed list
of unit prices for reference, as well as specific detail Df road
lengths, curves, culverts, drainage, and crowns. (14.E-SECOPT). The
last project was to produce bids for the following roads:
Comayagua Department
Cortes Department
Copan Department

55.55 km roads
42.30 km roads
60.00 km roads

2,008.295 Lemp:ras
1,~65.584 Lempiras
826.465 Lempiras

Totals

157.85 km roads

4,300.344 Lempiras
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SECOPT maintains its own internal reference unit price and overall
estimates of the total civil work costs. In almost all cases in recent
years the contractors have made bids below the reference price. This
is most likely because of considerable competition for work and the
econumic depression of the country.
Can SECOPT get even lower prices? Conversations with SECOPT, AID, and
contractors suggest that it is doubtful th~t lower bids can be made.
Costs might be lowered by having contractors include more manual labor
as a component of their construction bid, but this is uncertain.
A recent bid procedure is illustrative of the bidding process:

o

The bid RFP was printed in the local press on June 12, 1986.
Fifteen construction firms were pre-qualified and asked to
submit bids.

o

Firms were askeu to bid on six blocks of rural roads.

o

Ten firms made bids.

o

The evaluation committee decides on lowest bidder.

o

Six awards were made to six different firms because each had
bid lowest in one block but was either second or higher in
another block.

o

Results were sent to AID for ~onfirmation and approval to
award contracts. (14.K-SECOPT, 1986)

It takes about six months from the bid time to contract award. The
contractor and SECOPT are requirEd to fulfill the following tasks:

o

SECOPT writes economic proposals and prepares bid documents
(three weeks)

o

Contrac~

o

SECOPT review panel examines bids (two weeks)

o

Contract with contractor is written (two weeks)

o

Review of contract by GOH Budget Office (4 weeks)

o

SECOPT corrections and review based on observations by the
8udget Office (one week)

o

Review by Government General Provision Office (two

o

Approval and signature of the President of the Republic
week)

bids are let and firms bid (three weeks)

wee~s)

(one
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o

Payments by Contractor of fees, legalization of contract, and
guarantee payment of 15-20Y. (one week)

o

Contractor obtains bond from commercial bank and bond
insurance companies (two weeks). (5.c- Republica de Honduras,
1985i

After these steps are compl~ted, the contractor is re~dy to begin work.
It was estimated by SECOPT that there are over 100 steps that a
contractor must fulfill in order to get a contract. However, most of
these only have to be done once and are thus automatic. An example is
registration with the College of Civil Engineers. From all available
evidence, very few Hondur~n companies view these bureaucratic obstacles
as a major problem. Their most serious problem is acquiring financial
loans to cnrry out the construction.
The contract itself is straightforward and follows standard procedures
used by AID worldwide. A recent contract reviewed, "Contrato Gobierno
de Honduras y Constructora Equipo de Construccion S. de R.L. de C.C."
(ECO) of December, 1985, shows the following:

o

Contract ~as for 27.9 kms for El Espinal-Plan de Turcios-San
Antonio de SARA in Olancho Department.

o

Contract to be completed in 210 days with 300 Lempira fine
for each day late after that date.

o

Total contract was L806.856 fixed price contract.

o

Specific clause No. 12 whereby contractor agrees to contract
as many people as possible from the community. (14.I-SECOPT,
1985)

3. Rural Road Construction
Rural road construction is implemented by the contractors using SECOPT
designs, plans, and specifications. SECOPT and AID engineers supervise
quality and implementation of the civil work. Even though the
contractor is responsible technically, the final responsibility rests
with 3ECOPT which is directly in charge of the constru~iion and
management and the quality control. The contractGr, in reality, is
contracted out for rental of equipment and machinery or for utilization
~f its equipmen~ and machinery for SECOPT.
SECOPT normally sets up construction programs with the following
criteria:
O. Blocks of 20 kilometer road systems are established.
O. Contractors are asked to bid on blocks.
O. Contractors have blocks of roads next to each other.
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Because of these criteria, the contractor will set-up camps along the
roadside near construction, and normally will have its own people and
will not use outside or community assistance for road construction.
Contractors prefer their own experie~ced people to training and working
with new people. The contractor will also have its own supervisory
engineer on location. These "loyalty' procedures seem logical since the
contractor always faces strict time and quality require~2nts.
There have been relatively few and minor problems with contractors. It
is estimated that there are only two contractor problems out of ten.
Those problems are considered minor. The principal reason given is the
continual re-assessment of pre-qualifications of potential contractors;
the elimination of troublesome contractors; and the self-elimination of
contractors who have had previous problems with SECOPT. Overall, tr~
contracting out system works smoothly.
4. Comparisons of Three Rural Road Construction Approaches
As stated above, there are three approaches for rural road construction
by SECOPT in Honduras. This comparison highlights the differences,
discusses advantages and disadvantages, and assesses efficiencies and
effectiveness of these approaches from ~n institutional standpoint.
(a) Assessment of Construction Needs
Direct Administration: SECOPT Unit gets requests from rural
communities who apply. An established list of roads is made. Requests
are taken mainly from Choluteca area in south zone. Plan for building
the roads is agreed upon with community action.
Limited Contracting Out (AID): SECOPT and AID engineers use National
Development Plan ~nd community requests. A list of sites is made.
Plans are made well in advance according to year schedule and
appropriate plans.
Full Contracting Out: SECOPT gets requests from head office. Engineers
make site visits. Yearly plan is made.
(b) Planning and Design
Direct Administration: Economists do brief socio-economic study of
region to determine cost benefits of approach. Point system of
SECOPT is used to determine the priority of the site. Engineers make
preliminary and basic road designs. Roads are considered basic and do
not require major technical effort.
Limited Contracting Out: SECOPT and AID engineers and economists
prepare a basic socio-economic s~udy and determine priorities in road
improvement o~ the basis of SIC ratios. A road and agriculture
inventory is carried out in the field to identify construction,
maintenance and rehabilitation costs and the agricultural and social
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benefit. B3sic or prelimjnary engin~ering design plans are prepared and
mostly used to determine the needs of renting equipment on the basi5 of
daily hourly costs.
Full Contracting Out: El~borate a~d full technical studies conducted.
Normally have 100 kilometer long roads. Feasibility is detailed to
dete.mine priorities basec on the NOV, etc. Feasibility is done by
consultants with the assistance of SECOPT. Final decisicns are made and
include a complete specification and cost estimation and all the
bidding documents needed to contract out the construction work.
(c) Use of Contractors
Direct Administration: No contractors used. All manual labor from the
community.
Limited Contracting Out: Use 12-20 different contract firms in
competitive bidding. Contractors used for equipment and limited
construction work items such as subbase culverts, etc. Management and
supervision is under the responsibility of SECOPT/AIU.
Full Contracting Out: Use 5-10 construction firms in competitive
bidding. Construction, management and responsibility to fulfill the
design requirements are by the contractor only. Supervision, reporting
and monitoring during construction are carried out by contracted
consultants, individuals, or companies.
(d) Quality
Direct Administration: Quality is "as good as it has to be." Belief
that community roads are mainly for few vehicles and do not
require sophisticated quality.
Limited Contracting Out: Excellent quality and performance by
contractors to get medium-level roads.
Full Contracting Out: Excellent upgraded quality. Require high
technical quality. Believe that upgraded roads will require less
maintenance and therefore longer lifetime. In other words, by cutting
maintenance costs and reducing vehicle operation, costs due to better
road conditions will minimize the total transportation cost during the
entire lifetime of the road.
(e) Administration

Direct Administration: Has 30 personnel with 15 professionals and 15
support staff. All personnel in Teguigalpa. Use own vehicles to
go to two road sites of Santa Barbara Department and r.holuteca.
Limited Contracting Out: Has 150 personnel with 40 technical and the
rest supporting staff. Some of staff decentralized in San Pedro Sula
and in department capitals where they are carrying out road
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construction.
Full Contracting Out: Two diff~rent·and independent staffs. Both
have over 100 personnel with 30-40% ·professional and rest supporting
staff. High degree of personnel in department capitals.
Clearly, the Direct Administration approach utilizing manual labor from
the ~ommunity is distinct from the other two models. It uses food for
work, pays workers directly daily for labor on the roads, has its own
machinery, and is perhaps the most grassroot approach to ro~d
construction. Its style contrasts distinctively from the AID and
IDB/World Bank model of contracting out.
D. Economic Analysis
1. General
Accurate economic cost analysis of a rural road should cover all the
transportation expenditures related to the road. In other words, any
cost comparison should include construction, maintenance,
rehabilitation and user economic expenditure costs during the service
life time of the road. Usually the life time period of a rural road is
15 to 20 years. By determining the total cost of any given traffic
volume one can determine the least cost road alternative. If this
information were available one could determine what should be the most
efficient and least cost rural road administration in Honduras.
Since the economic cost information of the Honduran rural
transportation is not available, cost comparisons can be done by
compari~on of construction quality and cost together.
Cost comparisons
ar~ mdde among the following three alternative road construction
approaches:

o

SECOPT/ Manual Labor intensive labor by direct
administration

o

AID/SECOPT limited contracting out

o

IDB/SECOPT full contracting out

2. Expenditure Disbursement and Project Modification of SECOPT/AID
Project
The SECOPT/AID Rural Road construction agreement was signed on January
22, 1980 and was planned for four years (1980-1983). AID provided
$10,970,000 in loan funds (40 years, 10 year grace period, 2 % interest
for first 10 years, 3 X interest per annum thereafter) and $230,000 in
grants to finunce the reconstruction of 650 kilometers of rural access
roads and 250 kilometers of rural trails in the western region of
Honduras. Combined with GOH contributions, the total program
expenditures amounted to $14,950,000. Table IV-1 shows the details of
the program expenditures. (C.14- AID, 1980)
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It was determined that a new institutional delivery system of
contracting out to private firms would be used. Access roads were to be
reconstructed according to GOH national standards and thereafter
maintained by the Directorate General of Maintenance.
Table IV-2 shows that the access roads were to be reconstructed with
capital intensive technological methods and rural trails were planned
to be labor intensive in construction. This program was modified during
the project period.
Table IV-3 shows how various amendments increased the financing for
this program by AID to $41,900,000 in loans and $960,000 in grants.
Combined with GOH contributions, the total financing 07 the program
reached to $57,000,000.
In addition, the total number of kilometers of rural roads and trails
to be reconstructed was increased from 900 to 1,510 and the program was
extended for another three years. Expected completion date is the end
of 1986. Thus, AID financing increased by 300 ~, rural roads to be
reconstructed was augmented by 68 ~, and 75 X more time was required to
complete the program than was initially planned.
In addition to the increased program goal of 610 kilometers, it was
necessary to increase assistance and time because the program was
altered so as to exclude labor intensive reconstruction of rural
trails. According to AID/Honduras engineers, all roads were
reconstructed according to the specifications and designs originally
programmed for access roads only. As seen in Table IV-2, access roads
were estimated to be twice as expensive to reconstruct as rural trails
and this estimate was v~ry close to the actual construction costs
during the years 1982-1985.
3. Comparative Ass~5sment of Contracting Out and Direct
Administration of Rehabilitated Roads
It was not possible to compare the costs of different AID-funded
projects because the rural road reconstruction under the AID program
used contracting out and because the rural trails dimension of the
program was dropped. Consequently, it was necessary to compare AID
contracting out of rural road construction with SEC OPT (IDE) direct
admini~tration reconstruction of rural roads. The latter utilized a
manual labor/labor intensive approach and is similar to that originally
intended by AID for the reconstruction of rural trails.
The direct administration method of SECOPT/Manual Labor uses community
labor and pay5 them the minimum a;ricultural wage. Roads are designed,
supervised, and constructed by community members with SECOPT engineers.
Little heavy equipment is used and materials are purchased from the
Proveeduria. Because the communities must be organized for this work,
because it is labor intensive, and because it uses the slow method for
material purchases through the Proveeduria, this direct administration
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reconstruction approach to rural roads is slow.
SECOPT/Manual Labor constructed new 'roads and reconstructed existing
rural roads. For purposes of comparfson, the reconstruction road costs
were used. The reconstruction average cost was L23,808 for SECOPT
projects during the years 1982-1985. This SECOPT direct administration
rural road program was also much smaller than the AID program used in
the comparison. (13.J- SECOPT, 1986)
The SECOPT/AID contracting out program of rural road construction (5220164), in contrast, uses no community labor and is capital intensive.
Table IV-4 below, shows that for the SECOPT/Manual Labor program labor
costs constituted 73X and equipment cost (depreciation) 5 to 8 X of
total project costs. (13.J-SECOPT',1986) In comparison, the AID
contracting out program labor costs were only 19 perc~nt and equipment
costs were 63X of total project costs incurred in rural road
reconstruction during the years 1982-1985. (14.J-SECOPT, 1986)
Table IV-4 shows that the SECOPT/ID8 direct administration rural road
reconstruction cost per kilometer for the years 1982-1985 was slightly
(although perhars not significantly) less than that of AID's
contracting-out cost for the same period---L23,808 versus L26,892.
Advantages of contracting out lie in economies of equipment use,
procur~ment of materials, and time, while advantages of direct
administration are economies of labor, non-profit production, and
equipment use. These advantages appear to result in fairly comparable
overall costs. The cust comparison data indicate that AID contracting
out to private firms of road reconstruction reduced the time, but was
slightly more costly. Moreover, more AID financial assistance in
foreign currency loans was needed to accomplish the task. On the
macroeconomic level, this may have aggravated the persistent balance of
payments problem.
4. Assessment of AID/SECOPT Construction Bids
Table IV-5 provides information on six recent AID-funded rural
road projects. The table summarizes the basic engineering and cost
information of these six projects: 1) project location, 2) contractor,
3) number of bidders, 4) length of each road, 5) the lowest bidder
price, 6) government estimated cost, 7) minimum bidding cost per
kilometer, 8) the ratio of the maximum to the mini~um bidder price, and
9) the ratio between the second low bid price to the lowest or minimum
bidding cost.
According to Table IV-5, in five of si~ projects the government
estimates were about 10-15 'l. more than the contractors bidding prices.
It also indicates that the ratio between the highest bidding cost to
the low~st one varies between 1.18 to 1.46. Th~ data indicate that the
difference between the upper limit and the lower limit bidding price is
only 18 to 46 per~~nt. The difference between the second lowest bid and
the lowest bid is only one to eight percent. Only in Project No.5 is
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the difference larger, at 11~. It appears that there is a spirit of
competition among the contractors. However, we find it unusual that in
these six projects a different contractor provided the low bid, so that
in no case was the winner of one bid. the low bid in another project. It
is possible that a more careful analysis of thes~ six projects would
explain the rather tidy distribution of projects to contractors.
Table IV-5 also indicates that the total construction cost of a
SECOPT/AID rural road varies mainly between L28,000 to L38,000 per
kilometer. Only in project No.3 was cost per kilometer significantly
lower, at about L13,000/kilometer. It seems that the improvenlent needs
for this rural road project are minimal.
5. Cost Comparisons Between Direct Administration and Contracting
Out of Road Construction
The direct administration rur~l road ~onstruction approach uses
concentrated manual labor to build roads. These roads are designed for
a travelling speed of 20, 30, and 40 kilometers/hour for mountainous,
hilly, and level terrain respectively. The maximum longitudinal grade
varies between 6Y. and 101. for a design speed of 40 kilometers/hour and
9X to 121. for design speed Df 20 kilom~ters/hour. According to
SECOPT/Manual Labor Unit documents (13.J- SECOPT, 1986) the road width
is 4.5 meters. These ro~ds are all weather roads.
The direct administration approach has two different groups of roads in
their reports. (13.J- SECOPT, 1906) The first group includes 17 roads
with a total length of 65,5 kilometers. The total construction cost was
L2,995,089. Thus the construction cost was L45,726/kilnmeter. The
second group includes 136.3 kilometers and its total construction cost
was L3,579,823, or L26,264/kilometer.
The average construction cost of all 65.5 kilometers and 136.3
kilometers of road'- is L32,581/kilometer. This average cost per
kilometer is very similar to cost per kilometer of rur~l roads
constructed under the AID/SECOPT program. (See Table IV-5)
It seems that the unit cost of construction for a low standard rural
road by direct administration (manual labor and labor intensive) and
that of limited contracting out (AID) is similar and according to the
same construction records is about L30~000 to L35,OOO/kilometer.
However, these costs do not include administration, supervision, and
other general overhead expenditures.
In order to compare limited contracting out, and full contracting out,
one needs to compare both costs and product quality. The most
expeditious way to compare is to conduct an analysis of unit prices
of road projects carried out by different contracting methods.
Table IV-6 compares the unit price of work item in AID and IDB/IBRD
road projects. The projects flnanced by AID/SECOPT w~re done by limited
contracting out. Projects financed by the IDB/IBRD were contracted out
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to national contractors. The cost data from one lOB financed road
is related to unpaved rural roads. The otl,;r lOB financed
project and the lBRD financed road project are asphalt secondary roads
and a major highway, respectively • .

projec~

Table lV-6 indicates that the unit prices of the lOB-funded rural road
is equal to or less than to the unit prices of the AID rural road
projects. It appears that contracting out will generate lower unit
rrices and it is clear that construction by administration with limited
contracting out reduces the price of a given and specified work item.
Contracted out unit prices for principal work items are similar in all
syste~s. But in the direct administration and limited contracting out
approaches there are other costs that do not eyist in the full
contracting out procedures used by the IDB/lBRD approach. These
additional expenditures include 1) project management and
administration, 2) contractor surervision, and 3) quality control.
According to SECOPT documents this expenditure might be in the ran~e of
15 %. (13.J-SECOPT, 1986)
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TABLE IV-l
PROJECTIONS OF PLANNED EXPENDITURES
BY PROJECT YEAR
(US $(00)

SOURCE

PROJECT YEAR
1

ConstrLlc t ion

2

TOTALS

3

1,419

3,502

3,929

8,850

Maintenance

750

o

0

750

Evaluation

50

50

50

150

2,219

3,552

3,979

9,750

Construction

823

818

815

2,456

Maintenance

214

142

465

821

TOTAL GOH

1~037

960

1,280

TOTAL

~3~,2~5~6~_____4~,~5~1~2~~5~·,~2~5~9__~1~3~,0~2~7

TOTAL AID

Inflation/Contingencies

74

538

1,311

3,277

1,923

( 10 % )

GRAND TOTAL

3~,3~3~0~____~5~,~05~0~-=6~,5~7~0~~1~4.,9~5~0

_______________________________

• • N _ _ _ _ _ _ _•

__________________________ _

Source: Agency for International Development, "Project Paper, Rural
Trails and Access Roads, 522-016~1" 1980.
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TABLE IV-2
CONTRACTING OUT CONSTRUCTION COSTS OF RURAL ROADS:
PLANNED AS COMPARED WITH. ACTUAL COSTS, 1982-85
(cost per km)

RURAL TRAILS

ACTUAL 21
ACCESS ROADS

(Lem)

( Lem)

PLAr~NE:D

ACCESS ROADS
( Lem.)

11

Labor

5,007

22

6,509

61

5,147

22

Materie.l

1,350

6

1,070

10

1,404

6

Equipment

16,142

72

3,07C

29

16,845

72

TOTAL

22,499

100

10,649

100

23,396

100

Kilometers

to'50

250

1,050

SourcE:;>s:
(1)

AID, "Project Paper, Rural Trails and Access Roads( 522-035 and
522-0164," January 22,1980.

(2)

SECOPT,"Informe de Avance Construccio'n y mejoramiento Caminos
Vecinales y de acceso," February 28,1986.

Notes:
(1)

Some cost breakdown assumed to prevail as planned for access roads
in project paper.

(2)

Project originally plann~d for 900 kilometers of reconstructed
roads and trails, 650 kilometers of access r~,ds at a planned cost
of L2,4 c 9 and 250 kilometers of "ural trails at a planned cost of
LI0,649. V~yious amendments since 1980 increased AID financing by
approximately 300 Yo and planned road reconstruction from 900
kilometers to 1,510 kilometers, or by 68 percent.
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TABLE IV-3
PROGRAM OF RURAL ROADS·PROJECTS SECOPT/AID
(uS ".)

DESCRIPT~ON

GRANT

AID

TOTAL

GOH

A. Construction
Rural Roads
Vehicle, equipment,
tools
Administration

36,410,000
184,000
696,000

44,676,000

480,000
2,000,000

664,000
2,696,000

600,000

600,000

800,000

166,000

966,000

1,590,000

386,000

1,976,000

--------

1,256,000

1,256,000

-------

300,000

-------

20,000

946,000

3,846,000

(.ccess roads
Bridge Rio Higuito

8,266,000

B.Maintenance
Equipment

r~pair

Road maintenance
C. Evaluation

300,000

Project Evaluation
D. Bias

2C,000

E. Contingencies

60,000

TOTALS

960,000

2,840,000

41,940,000 14,100,000 57,000,000

,

Source: SECOPT, ~Contenido Informe de avance construc~ion y
mejoramiento caminos vecinales y de acceso, AID 522-035," February
28,1986.
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TABLE IV-4
RECONSTRUCTION COSTS PER KILOMETER OF RURAL ROADS:
SECOPT DIRECT AOMINISTRATION AND, AID CONTRACTING OUT,1982-1985

SECOPT(BID)
DIRECT ADMINISTRATION
Lempiras

(3)

Percent::lge

AID LIMITED
CONTRACTING OUT (1)
Lempiras

Percentages

DIRECT COSTS
Labor
Material
Equipment
Other

17,381

73

5,109

19

714

3

1,345

5

1,190

5

714

3

16,942

b3

___ 0 _____________________________________

Sub-Total

19,999

84

23,396

87

3,095

13

1,614

6

714

3

1,882

7

3,809

16

3,496

13

23,808

100

26,892

100

INDIRECT COSTS
Supervision,
Evaluation, and
~dministration

Other
Sub-Total
TOTAL
Sources:
(1)
(2)
(3)

SECOPT, "Contenido Informe de avance construccinn y mejoramiento
caminos vecin~le5 y de acceso AID 522-035, "February, 1986. ( For
years 1982-1985.)
SECOPT, "M~todo para la integraci&n de precios unitarios y
programacion de caminos a construirse por mana de obra," undated,
cerca,1984.By Jose Monzon.
SECOPT,"Informe final, sub-programa: Caminos por mana de Dbra,"
June, 1986. ( For years 1982-1985. Data for reconstructed roads
only.

TAI!-!- IV-:51
ANALYSIS OF SECOPT-AID

PROJECT

COISTRUCTION BIDS

--------ROAD IWIE

LENGTH lOWER BID- GOVERrlr!ENT til NI IU1
CI(I'I5I DIHG PRICE ESTlMTED
BIDDING
CLE/'I>IRASI COSTS CLPSI COST PER
LPS/KI1

N).

RATIDI
MI. BID

ffiltt

"IN. BID
PRICE

RATlol
2ND LOW

NO. OF
BIDDERS

AWARDED
CONTRACTDR

PROJECT
NO.

HAlE

.M2

1ST LOW
BID
2ND LOW

!III!

El!1~

1ST LQI.l
BID PRICE

-------------------------------------------------------------------

-----------------

1.

2.

S.n hldroLa Gu •••
8no •• Air •• y Acc.

22.7

732,:52"

B:51,:519

32,313

1.....

1.078

'1

Dr.V·doll
.t 411.

1.

Slvu.totp~u.-

17.1>:5

678018 ..

731.6 ..8

38."2"

1.18

1.01

B

CONT£C

2.

60.0

79".1>:53

926.46:5

13.2.... •

1.31

1.01

PRODECDN

3.

CustlrC., AQu.
OulcR. Lo. T.b.loco.
t.rro Bl.nco
3.

Florld.-El P.raC.o
L•• Flor •• -NY ••
E.p.r.nz ••• tc.

0'1
It.

\0

1.'""(,, ~ Cu.tec.-

21.3

602.68..

6..0.41:5

2B.2'J5

1.3:5

1.03

7

P.vl ..... to.
de Hondur ••

It.

:563.921

636.202

3".:590

1.29

1.11

6

DIItATRAC

:5.

32,"60

1."6

1.07

AY3C

6.

l1c-aab.r
:5.

~v(o

• CustKASt •• Cruz d. Dulc.
y AcCHD.

16.3

6.

S.n Isidro-St ••
Cruz d. YOJo.

19.6

•

R~.b'lltetlon

only

SourC.1
SECOPT. "R••ult.do. d. la Evaluaclon d. Contrato •• " July. 1986.

CORDCV~
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TABLE IV-6
COMPARISON OF UNIT PRICE/TOTAL COST
FOR EACH REFERENCE PROJECT
(LEMPIRAS) ..
WORK ITEM

AID
AID
RURAL*l RURAL*

AID
RURAL*

IDB
RURAL

IBRD
ASPHALT

UNPAVEDeUNPAVED~UNPAVED4ROADS~

IDB
HIGHWAYS
~\SPHAL T**b

---------------------------------------------------------------------

Cleari ng/Tree
Roots (hectares)

Clearing(hectares)
Sub-bc.se (m S

800
750-800

800

500

Concrete Class B(m3)

360

Crushed Rock (m3)

1,600

19

24

700

)

Concrete Class A(m S )

1,800

495
350

350

210-500 185-200

210

148

184

225

210

144

158-178

150

180

190-210

190

275

117-256

260

36

150

T.C.R. 24" ( mI>

210

200

T.C.R. 30" (mI>

275

250

T.C.R. 36" (mI>

345-350

Structural
Excavation

47

335

300

* Limited contracting-out
** Full contracting-out
SOllrces:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

(5)
(6)

SECOPT, "Reconstrucci6n de Camino5 de Acceso-Proyecto5
Seleccionados," Grupo de Envio No. 10, July 15, 1986.
SECOPT, "Proyectos Seleccionados Tomando en Cuenta las
Condiciones Soc.io-econ~micas y del Media Ambiente," Grupo de
Envio, No.9, 1985.
SECOPT, Informe de Avance Construcci~n y Mejoramiento Caminos
Vecinales y de Acceso," February, 1986.
SEC OPT , "Informe Final: Supervisi5n de Construcci6n Camino
Vecinal: Valle de Lomas, Cataguacha, y Orito- EI Desv(o y Camino
de Acceso y el Desvio Hacienda Vieja," Consultores CONASH, April,
1985.
SECOPT, "Informe Final- Supervi5i~n de Construcci6n de Carreteras
y Puentes, Proyecto Danli- Santa Maria," 1984.
SECOPT, " Informe Final de la Construccitn de Proyecto Carretera
Sonaguera Km. 35," November, 1985.

CHAPTER 5
CONTRACTING OUT: THEORY AND HONDURAN REALITY
In this chapter, the major features of contracting out in Honduras are
summarized. In doing so we are particularly interp.sted in
unde~standing the Honduran reality of contracting out.
This reality is
then contrasted to commonly believ.:!d theses as to the effects of
contracting out more generally.
A. Contractors as Producers
Contractors in Honduras are considered producers of goods and services
but not as innovators or creators. Their role is to produce what the
central government dictates. Very few contractors are engaged in
creating new products but rather follow the instructions, plans, and
designs that are made by the government offices.
In Honduras bids are specific in stating the kinds and types of
services or goods required. Potential contractors are normally
requested to submit only economic bids based on referenced unitary
prices established by :he central government. The bids are
straightforward and the lowest bidder wins the contract.
Once contracts are awarded, contractors are expected to work under the
close supervision of the central government supervisors and inspectors.
At the termination of public works cc.ntractors are paid, released, and
their obligation terminates. There is little room for contractors to
bring about technological or managerial changes.
B. Private Sector Employment Generation
Construction projects have assisted considerably the construction
industry to create at least 20,000 new jobs per year. This calculation
is based on the projects looked at in this study and is at best an
estimate. These are either directly in the AID-funded projects or
through the projects that must be terminated on a self-help basis.
There is a ripple effect also in that indirect employment generation
will take place a5 contractors purchase materials and supplies for
construction.
AID lean money itself is enough to create new jobs. It is estimated
that there are 45,000 normal construction employment jobs in Honduras.
Loan funds are assisting in creating another ~O,OOO jobs.
It should be noted, however, that AID-funded construction projects in
rural roads are machine intensive. If a shift to labor intensive
construction were to take place, it would be possible to create even
more jobs. In both housing and education projects, the appropriate
technology is labor intensive. !n the rural roads project it would be
possible to create at least another 900 jobs (45 people per road
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prOject X 20 projects) by using more manual labor approaches.
Construction jobs have strong forward and backward linkages with
employment in other sectors. As the Project Paper for Shelter for the
Urban Poor II, Loan No. 522-HG-008, points out, the multiplier effect
of a construction project can range from 3.12 to as high as 6.67 times
the initial capital investment. A conservative estimate, therefore, is
that the three sectors ~ill generate a long-run total investment in
Honduras of over $150 million. (11.G- AID, 1985)
A positive effect on these three sectors, therefore, is that the
construction firms do hire new people. In the 60 firms reviewed in the
construction firm study, it was noted that there is always a core staff
but that the firm hired piecemeal labor for construction jobs. (5.MLardizabal, 1986)
C. Contracting Out Theses Versus Honduran Reality
The major purpose fOT contracting out is to reduce costs and to improve
quality for the government. The thesis is that the private sector is
able to deliver goods and services at a lower cost than government
agencies. There are a host of arguments in the contracting out
literature to substantiate that this should be the case. However, not
all of the principal theses stated in the literature hold for Honduras.
We will state the general theses of contracting out as described in the
literature and then describe its application to Honduras. The general
theses all relate to cost considerations, but for conceptual
convenience they can be discussed under three major categories.
Several theses deal with institutional issues of contracting out.
Thesis 1: Private firms can avoid bureaucratic problems inherent
in local government.
Situation: Private sector has fewer bureaucratic problems than public
sector, but it takes 6 months for contract award and thus the
private sector must deal with bureaucracy as well.
Thesis 2: Contracting out produces better management.
Situation: Although the government suffers from inefficiencies,
underutilization of personnel, and lack of productivity, the
private sector is not as competent in management skills as
one might expect.
Thesis 3: The government gives up some direct control of the process of
providing good~ and services.
Situation: The government maintains fairly strict control over
contractors, primarily through bureaucratic oversight, and
therefore the level of direct control remains almost the
same.
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Thesis 4: Contracting out permits gre~,er flexibility than direct
administration in adjusting program size and organizational
structure.
Situation: This thesis has reasonable support because it is more
difficult to change the personnel structure in the
government. Further, government tends to be highly
centralized and inflexible.
Thesis 5: There will be resistance by the public sector to contracting
out because of employee pressure and fears of decliners in
service quality.
Situation: Public employees defend their long term employment security
which leads to resistance. But, in those cases where
contracting out is a well-established practice, there is
little resistance because more contracting means fewer
responsibilities.
Thesis 6: Contracting out limits the growth of government.
Situation: Because the public sector is viewed as employer of last
resort and because of public employee resistance, the size of
government has not been reduced.
Thesis 7: Contracting out may affect locational distribution of
services negatively because contractors provide services
without attention to the "public" need.
Situation: In general, the location of construction in these ~ectors is
dictated by government. An exception was the housing project
No. 007, in which the developer built housing on his land
without consideration for the locational needs of low-income
population.
Thesis 8: Private contracting increases the possibility of
service disruption.
Situation: There are several cases in housing and rural roads of
contractors not finishing projects, perhaps up to 10 % of
total construction.
The following theses are concerned with technological issues.
Thesis 9: With contracting out, the priv~te sector i~ motivated to
explore, experiment, and develop ~=w ~echnologies.
Situation: Public sector sets parameters for technology and does not
encourage new procedures. There is little incentive to bring
in innovation.
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The last set of theses relates to economic aspects--cost and
efficiency--of contracting out.
Thesis 10: Private sector has more fncentive to keep costs down with
competition.
Situation: There are reference prices, limited competition, and thus
only a limited degree of incentive to keep costs down.
Thesis 11: Private firms may have lower employee compensation costs.
Situation: Employee compensation costs about the same for public and
private sector. Also, Honduran law requires payment of the
13th month salary for both public and private workers.
Thesis 12: Contracting out will reduce the cost of providing goods and
services financed through the public sector. As a result,
consumers will benefit from lower prices.
Situation: The cost of construction is not substantially different
because of the difficulties in reducing the size of the
public sector, the use of reference prices, limited
competition, and a lack of incentives for innovation.
D. Use of Fees to Adjust Demand
There is a rationale in contracting out that persons who receive
a particular service should pay for it in accordance with use. (2.HHatry, 1983, p. 85 ) People will consider the services cost to them and
adjust their demand for the service in proportion to the value they set
on that service.
In Honduras, there are overriding contradictions of this thesis; in
certain sectors there are high payments by citizens for services, while
in other sectors nothing at all. In general, citizens are net inclined
to pay for servi~es when they can be obtained without fees. The free
rider problem is evident in a number of areas. Yet, the application of
user fees more generally may both contribute to economic efficiency and
cost recovery.
Examples from our study show that:
Housing: Good example of citizens paying fees for services for new
housing. There is considerable reluctance to pay betterment costs
entailed in reassessed land values in urban upgrading projects.
Education: A rural community pays $7,000 average and a rural family
pays $300 per family average for a new school constructed in the selfhelp approach.
Rural Roads: There is no fee for road usage by farmers either
directly or indirectly. Vehicle owners and transportation users will
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pay proportions based on usage through gasoline ~QX. Buses charge fares
to customers. Usually the increase in transportation costs is passed
directly to the farmers by the vehi~le owners.
There is not enough information available to go beyond these initial
observations. It is hard to assess, for example, whether the
introduction of fees and charges would lead to reduced costs to the
government and citizens. In Honduras, it appears that it is easier to
increase fees than to raise or collect general taxes. Since these fees
are normally based on actual costs, the increa~ed fees are easier to
justify to the public. The kinds of fees most commonly used are:

o Licensing

fees for professionals, vendors, or contractors

o Airport tax for travelers to pay for airports
o Gasoline tax for road users

o

Registration fees for vehicles

Our rationale for addressing user fees is to explore means for offering
services and to justify long range sustainable projects that recover
costs. There is no doubt, for example, that in eduLation contracting
out incurs a more direct cost expenditure to the central government.
One Cdn justify the use of the self-help approach in order to charge
citizen-consumers for services and goods for which they would otherwise
not be charged directly. Our concern, however, is that there be equal
sharing of responsibility among all users.
E. Alleviating Bottlenecks in Procurement of Production and Goods
There are two bottlenecks facing both contracting out and direct
administration of public work projects. And there are no planned
actions by the central government to alleviate them. They are:
1. Purchase of materials and supplies through the central
governments' National Prr.curement Office (Proveeduria>
2. Legal procedures required to award contracts
Both procedures take about six months and cost energy, time, and
resources. 80th require serious reflection by the central government
regarding its role in fostering development and providing adequate
goods and services in the most cost effective manner.
There is no doubt that checks and balances are required by the central
government in utilizing public funds. Citizens deserve
to have t'leir government respond properly and adequately in procuring
production and goods. Nevertheless, there seems to be a
balance that must be struck between adequate controls and the equally
important need to provide timely services. We were not able to
calculate in terms of cost what these present procedures are, but it is
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clear from our observations and assessment that those costs are
considerable.
This issue
government
may not be
procedures

indicates a need for policy dialogue among central
officials and international donors, Administrative reform
enough to make slow and m~asurable reforms. Present
are not effective for successful implementation of prOject5.

F. Expectations Versus Performance; An Economic Perspective
Contracting out of publicly financed goods and services can take many
forms. In a mixed (pluralistic) system like that of Honduras, few such
goods and services have ever been delivered entirely by either the
public sector or the private sector exclusively. Between these two
extremes on a continuum lies contracting out as seen below:
Public
Sector
ryelivery

Contracting Out
(Public and Private Sector)
<
>

Private
Sector
Delivery

This fundamental point is often misunderstood: contracting out is
neither private nor public but a combination of both. Therefore, when
we refer to a change in institutional arrangements, we refer to a
change in degree but not in kind. More specifically, in the case of
Honduras and this ~tudy, we are referring to an increase in contracting
out of goods and services financed by the public sector--a move toward
more private sector delivery.
What can reasonably be expected when publicly financed goods and
services are shifted more toward private sector delivery? To begin
with, there will be certain transition costs associated with every
institutional change -- the greater the change, the greater the cost;
the more often the change, the more often the costs are incurred. This
is one unambiguous cost which is typically ignored, most probably
because it is difficult to measure.
Many of the expected benefits from major institutional change require a
time period sufficient for new institutional learning to occur, as well
as time to correct institutional and administrative inconsistencies.
Impatience with this process as well as a negat.ive reaction to the
transition costs often forces decision makers to change the
institutional arrangements again and again. Consequently, th~ long run
benefits are not realized immediately while the short ,un transition
costs continue or increase visibly. In Honduras, there appears to be a
significant amount of experimentation with institutional changes in
contracting out of publicly 1inanced assistance giving rise to cost
overruns and delays.
Another hidden cost associated with the move from self help to more
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contracting cut to the private sector is opportunity cost. In most
countries such as Honduras, there exists high
undere~ployment in many sectors such as agriculture and industry.
If
alternative productive employment is not available to the marginal
population and if political considerations prevent mass redundancies of
public bureaucrats, the opportunity cost of employing these people is
zero. More contracting out to the private sector should take these
costs into consideration even though they may not enter in the
calculations of cost-benefit, efficiency, or other proj~ct
measurements.
dev~loping

Theoretically, it is usually assumed that people who do not work will
not be employed and that people will not work unless they are paid
wages. In Honduras, the marginal poor often volunteer their labor for
rural school and road construction and the number of public employees
is not reduced in proportion to decreased public sector activity.
Contracting out often requires additional government monitoring and
supervision of the private expenditure of public funds. All too often,
this results in duplication of work in proj~ct implementation. This
reduces the expected efficiency of contracting out, discourages the
shrinkage of the public sector (cost, employment, and deficits), and
mitigates against the expansion of the private sector. Such a
duplication is unavoidable with contracting out since public money
cannot be expended wiehout public centrol. In the last analysis, the
loans are public debt and therefore public responsibility.
This brings us to perhaps the most controversial issue of all; the
relative efficiency of public production, private economic activities,
and the performance of the hybrid contracting-out delivery system. It
is unclear whether one particular approach is more efficient in terms
of maximizing output at a given cost or minimizing costs for a given
output. When all costs are considered and included, the public sector
production should be less costly since profits are not required and
lower taxes are paid by public enterprises. But, public enterprises
are often monopoly producers where the primary objective is neither
least cost, maximum output, nor economic profit. Because of political
and administrative factors, economic efficiency may be even less
achievable. When this reality is taken into consideration and all costs
correctly calculated, public producers in Honduras and elsewhere
typically do not turn out to be the efficient producer's they
theor~tically could be.
Private producers, while theoretically disadvantaged, are often more
competitive than their public counterparts and have more flexibility in
management, procurement, and production. All these are conducive to
efficiency and are the basis for the assertion that privnte sector
production is superior to public production. However, to the extent
that private firms are not competitive producers, their efficiency is
reduced in the same way that the efficiency of public enterprises is
impaired by monopoly and bureaucracy.
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What significance do all these have for our study of contracting out of
publicly financed goods to private contractors in HondurNs? To
reiterate, contracting out is neither private nor public but a hybrid
of both. In addition, the public sector in Honduras is not a
monopolistic producer of urban housing, rural roads or rural schools.
Nor is the private construction industry as competitive as theory would
require for maximum efficiency. This makes contracting out, by
definition, neither as efficient as private production under ideal
conditions nor as inefficient as public production under the worst
scenario of a monopoly situation referred to above. PUT'ists may find
this conclusion disconcerting si~ce they seek absolute, indisputable
conclusions on efficiency one way or another. Unfortunately, black and
white, efficient and inefficient conclusions will not be forthcoming
from studies of contracting out in Honduras or elsewhere under these
circumstances. All inefficiencies encount~red in the public sector
should not be viewed as inherent to the institutional arrangement, nor
should all efficiencies revealed in private production be considered natural.

CHAPTER 6
SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This study assessed the effect of contracting out on quality, time, and
C03t of construction activi~ies in Honduras. The study was conducted in
the three sectors: shelter and urban upgrading, rural primary school
construction, and rur~l roads. This ch~pter presents a summary of the
findings, policy recommendations, and suggestions for future study.
A. Contracting Out Environment

o The 1985 Contracting Law of Honduras provides an ample and positive
lehicle for potelltially stable and reasonable relationships between the
sector and private sector contractors.

~ublic

o

While the central government controls most funds for civil works, the
importance of foreign bilateral and multilateral fun~s cannot be
underestimated. The construction industry, therefore, is highly
dependent on central government and international donor funds and
projects for survival.

o Contracting out is viewed as the provIsion of services--in this case,
construction--by the private sector for government programs rather than
the turning over to the private 3ector of responsibility,
services, and decision making.

o There appears to be a strong preference among government personnel
for t~e maintenance of control over the entire project cycle of
planning, execution, and cperation and maintenance.

o However, the environment for increased contracting-out activity is
favojOable. Honduran contractor flrms are adequate for providing
government services. There is a reasonable degree of competition and
the government is able to negotiate fair and reasonable prices for
contracted services.
o Relatior:ships between contractors and government agencies are good
with some minimal problems and defaults. Bid procedures work relatively
smoothly, but certain bureaucratic delays are noted. One major
bottleneck is the delay between the bid time and contract award. This
problem lies squarely with the government. A comprehensive and well
completed design document prepared by the government will reduce
significantly inefficiencies and unnecessary conflicts between the
government and the contractors.

o Major

problems for contractors are 1) guarantee bonds, 2)
considerable delay in payments, and 3) legal and bureaucratic paperwork
and approvals.

o There

is little government control over potential collusion by
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private contractors in the bidding process. Even though the central
government accepts the low2st bid it is possible for contr'actors to
act in concert in the decision as to which contractor will take the
~ontract for different blocks of ro~ds, schools, or houses.
There is
some preliminary evidence th-it this may be happening in all three
sectors.

o The reference price established by government institutions based on
the u~it r.osts of inputs is the only indicator and determinant for
IOl'Je!Jt cost bids. It is based on specifications only and not
performance.
8. Effect!; of

Contra~',.£~ing

Out. on Public Service Delivery

o

The use of contracting out in Honduras does not strictly accord with
some of the traditicnal contracting out theses because of 1) a hi~h
degree of centraliz~tion that is traditional in Latin America and which
fosters an unwilll,n,:SS to decentralize, 2) an apparent inability io
reduce public sectol employment even with increased contracting out, 3)
some limitations in bidding processes that curtail competition, and 4)
central government inability to envision other opportunities fo~ the
consid~ration of creative ways to use contracting out.

o In direct administration, community contribution in the form of self
help has been an i~portant element in construction activities. It is
able to reduce the costs to government of some public works as much as
50 Yo using this approach. To a certain extent, it also deals with the
free-rider problem in providing public services to Hondurans who do not
pay any tax or fee.

a The qualities of construction by contracting out and by direct
administration are approximately the same. The reason is that the
publi~ sector r~tains res~onsibility, control, and final acceptance of
qual i ty contro I.

o Public sector employment levels in housing, education, and r03ds
sectors are not affected by contracting out. There appear to be
nei~her reductions in the number of employees nor are there indications
that the numhers of public sector employees will decrease because of
any transition to contracting out. Public sector employees continue to
hold the same positions for the same kinds of activities as when direct
administration was in force. What does appear to happen is a
duplication of effort when there is contracting out.

a Thera appear to be few, if any, effects of contracting out on changes
of consumer crQices with the exception of one housing project. Private
contractors as providers of construction services have little ability
to affect decision-making.

a Contracting out affects considerably community participation in
construction projects. It has had the effect of limiting the potential
for consumer participation by effectively blocking them from
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participating as manual laborers in construction projects in their own
communities.

a

Contracting out appears to have had the effect of reducing community
involvement and participation in mafntenance activities because
community members have less at stake'personally in the final product.
More importantly, maintenance activities generally are affected
negatively because there are no contractual requirements for the
contractor to carry out maintenance activities once construction is
complete.

a

In both approaches, it is the government that makes the decisions
(with minimal input from the communities) about selecting construction
siting. Private contractors are not able to influencp. location
decisions since these decisions are made by the central government.
C. Contracting Out Productivity

a Start-up time from RFP to contract award takes approximately six
months in most cases, but may take as long as one year. Construction
time by private contractors is much faster than by public agencies
because of less bureaucracy and paper work, fewer demands for acquiring
minimal price quotes for purchasing materials, and more flexibility in
management.

o Public agency civil works are slower as they must get approval from
the National Procurement Office (Proveeduria) for the purchase of
supplies and equipment; this approval process can take up to six months
for minimal orders.

o

The use of contracting out for specific construction projects may
affect the integration of projects adversely. The impleme~ting public
agency has better opportunities to provide liaison with other
government agencies for coordination among projects. This coordination
among projects and among public sector entities is much more difficult
for private contractors.

o

The public sector is more successful in gaInIng community support for
community-bas2d construction. Private contractors are often viewed by
the community as simple providers of discrete and limited service on
specific construction projects.
D. Housing 3helter

~onstruction

and Urban Upgrading

a

Institutional development within the National Housing Institute(INVA)
has a record of continual changing relationships as it searches for the
most efficient administrative operations. This lack of continuity in
administrative procedures may have adversely affected progra~matic
outcomes.

a

In urban upgrading, the Municipality of Tegucigalpa (CMDC) has used
both direct administration and contracting out while the Municipality
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of San Pedro Sula (MSPS) uses direct administration only.

o

There is no conclusive evidence that eitller direct administration or
the contracting out approach is better because of the mixed data bases
and the complexity of service delivery approaches.

o Inefficient bidding and procurement procedures, and p~or monitoring
of construction has affected construction timing and competition.
Delay and lack of competition have significant cost implication~.
E. Rural Primary School Construction

o MOE and AID/Honduras both

pref~r direct administration over
contracting out because it (1) involves less direct cost to MOE, (2)
allows greater community involvement in construction, and (3) increases
possibilities of operation and maintenance of rural schools.

o There is no evidence to support the thesis that contracting out has
lowered pubiic sector employment within MOE. Rather, there is
duplication of previous work with sontracting out. As a result, total
costs uf the two systems are similar.
.

o Bidding is not competitive in contracted out projects.

Pre-q'Jali~ied

contracting firms were awarded contracts based un pre-determi~ed noncompetitive prices established by the Ministry uf Education and AID. It
is difficult to assess how much lower construction costs could have
been under competitive bidding circumstances.

o

Global school construction costs appear to have been lower under
direct administration because of community contribution both in
monetary and in-kind labor terms. These contributions mean savings to
government of at least 50X. As a resuit, the comparative costs of
contracting out seem high. However, when community involvement as an
implicit project cost is included, the total costs of construction are
similar to direct administration, because the community provides the
othp.r 50 percent.

o Advantages of contracting out are 1)

expedie~cy in tim~, 2) less
bureaucracy in supply of materials, and 3) somewhat higher quality of
construction. Disadvantages are 1) less involvement with community, 2)
higher direct costs for the Ministry budget> and 3) limited concern for
the subsequent operation and maintenance of the school.

o Advantages of direct administration by the MOE are 1) concerted
effort by the Ministry in social promotion and follow-up, 2) less
direct costs to government, and therefore the capacity for building
more schools, 3) considerable improvements in operation and maintenance
of schools over long run. Disadvantages include 1) considerable
bureaucratic delays in school construction, 2) somewhat lower quality
schools, and 3) larger number public sector employees needed for
supervision and promotion.
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F. Rural Road Construction

o SECOPT

uses three dii"ferent rural road construction models: 1) direct
administration utilizing manual labor, 2) an AID-funded limited
contracting out approactl, and 3) an 'lOB/World Bank-funded full
contracting out approach. Each syste~ has advantages a~d disadvantages.
Any of the thrp.~ systems can be used effectively as all three have
well-organized delivery systems that function fairly smoothlv.

o AID

Proje~t Unit uses effective ~ontracting out system with 15-20
constructiDn firms. Relationships with contractors appear to be good to
excellent. Competitiveness is adequate. There is some possibility for
collusion by contractors as bids are given in bloc~s and recently only
one contractor has been awarded a contract per block. On the other
hand, the block system is efficient in optimizing the use of equipment.

o

AID Project Unit designs, plan' ; supervision, quality control,
follow-up, ~nd maintenance are a'l controlled. Private contractors
simply provide equipment and machinery rented out to conduct works
according to SECOPT orders. Some previous World Bank-funded projects
were managed in the same fashion.

o

An alternative full contracting out dpproach has been used by SECOPT
as well. The approach has compreh~nsive feasibility studies ca~ried out
by contracting out with the participation of SECOPT in the socioeconomic analysis. Final engineering is done partially by contractin9
out and partially by direct administration. Construction and
supervision are normally contracted out. The road quality appears to be
higher with this total system.

o Cost analysis indicates that the construction costs per kilometer
using direct adminj~tration approximately equals the method of limited
contracting out. The design standar~ of the rural roads in both methods
seems to be similar or equivalent.

o

Bidding unit prices are similar with practically no differences
betwepn SECOPT/AID and SECOPT/tDB rural road projects. Bidding unit
prices with limited contracting out ~nd full contracti~g out are
practically the same. The full contracting out approach may be less
expensive, therefore, because of tIle additional costs of
administration, supervision, quality control, and additional government
costs related to the limited contracting out approach.
G. Recommendations

o Consider

the u~~ of ~ontraLting out for services as part of the
policy dialogue at the highest levels of the Government of Honduras to
promote a more favorable privatization environment and an interest in
using the private sector for the production of goods, but also for the
provision of services as well as maintenance activities.

o Initiate concrete and specific means to streamline the governmental
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procedures for acquisition of materials and supplies through the
General Procurement Office (Proveeduria>.

o Initiate means tu streamline the legal and bureaucratic procedures
required for contractors to be award~d contracts. This should include
alternative means for requiring bonds for contracted out constructiun
activities.

o

Ma~imize to the fullest manual labor &nd labor intensive techniques
through contracting out so as to make full use of international donor
funds to generate employment and at the same time enhance the mechanism
of contracting out.

o Restructure public sector employment positions to avoid duplication
of efforts when contracting out.

o Monitor bidding procedures more carefully to assure against possible
collusion.

o Encourage

the e~ploration of contracting out alternatives in the
design of Project Papers.

o Institute the use of performance standards rather than specification
codes for construction project bidding to encourage innovations to
reduce costs.
For housing and urban upgrading:

o Establish

and monitor contracting out procedures that stipulate
clearly res~onsibilities and obligations.

o Encourage increased coordination among gov2rnment service del!very
agencies and with private sector developers. Problem~ of weak
coordination have had adverse effects on construction completion and
integration.

o Low cost bids in a cost-plus arrangement may not be the most
efficient basis for co~tract awards.
For primary school

constrl~tion:

o Efforts

should be made to assure community in.Jlvement in manual
labor. In particular, local residents can be used in more formalized
maintenance and operation schemes. Incentives to contractors who
utilize local labor in construction subsequent maintenance should De
establist.ed.

o There is a need for procedures to assure more competitive bidding in
school construction projects
~ There is a need to revise the internal reference cost system as the
guideline for establishing costs.
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For rural road construction:

o Requirements in

should include the use of local manual labor in
construction crews as a means of reducing costs and generating local
employment.
~ids

o Establish Phase I construction and Phase II maintenance
the same

contrac~s

in

bi~.

o

There is a need for SECOPT to update and broaden guidelines and
in the final design of projects so that contractors have
uniform ~tandards for construction.
capabilitiE~

H. Future Studies
The evidence documented here demonstrates that privatization leads to a
number of political and economic implications. Therefore, policy
decisions to use private means to deliver publicly financed goods and
services must be made in careful consideration of policy objectives at
the national level. At present, however, we know little about the
nature of the trade-offs between various national policy objectives
created by alternative means Qf service delivery. At least three
categories of additional warY. seem warranted. They ar~ as follows:

o Conduct similar studies in ether sectol's and countries. The current
study deals only with a limited number of cases in three sectors in
Honduras. In order to be able to make more sound generalization about
the factors affecting the effectiveness of privatization, we need to
analyze additional cases in different settings.

o Investigate the impact of privatization on political and economic
objectives at the national level. Policy makers need to know how
national policy objectives are affected by privatization of public
services. Of particular importance is to examine the cOllflicts between
political objectives which are often hidden and economic objectives
which are publicly annou~ced.
o Prepare

implementation manuals for officials in developing countries.
Many policy studies are not disseminated to public officials in readily
usable form. Implementation manuals designed to give practical
guidelines will greatly improve tIle process of policy dialogue and
facilitate policy reform in developing countries.
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